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# America's Electoral Future

How Changing Demographics Could Impact Presidential Elections from 2016 to 2032


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By William H. Frey, Ruy Teixeira, and Robert Griffin February 2016

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BROOKINGS

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# Introduction and summary

Results from the past two presidential elections provide evidence that the changing demography of the electorate—with its increased racial diversity—can affect election outcomes in ways that could not have been anticipated even a decade ago. A solid case can be made that the nation’s racial minority populations put President Barack Obama over the top in both 2008 and 2012.<sup>1</sup> But racial diversity is not the only demographic change that may have an effect on future presidential elections. In addition to greater diversity—which is primarily affecting the younger part of the electorate—the older part of the voting population is growing more rapidly as the huge Baby Boom generation ages.

These demographic shifts—toward both a more racially diverse younger electorate and a larger older electorate—certainly should change the playing field in terms of how the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as their candidates, appeal to these shifting voting blocs, which often have different interests.<sup>2</sup> And the pace of demographic change varies across geography, with some fast-growing states such as Arizona, Texas, and Florida seeing the effects of the nation’s rising diversity much more sharply than others. Yet even slow growing states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan will experience significant rising diversity in the coming years and, importantly, an aging of their electorates driven by large contingents of Baby Boom residents. These state-level demographic changes will leave strong imprints on the voting populations captured by the all-important Electoral College, forcing parties and candidates to recalibrate their strategies for success.

This report explores how these demographic changes could shape the electorate, as well as potential outcomes in the next five presidential elections using national and state demographic projections produced by the States of Change project. In a 2015 report and interactive,<sup>3</sup> this project presented a time series of long-term projections of race and age profiles for the populations and eligible electorates of all 50 states to 2060. This report focuses on what those projections imply for the presidential elections of 2016, 2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032.

The States of Change: Demographics and Democracy project is a collaboration supported by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation that brings together the Center for American Progress, the American Enterprise Institute, and demographer William H. Frey of the Brookings Institution. The views expressed in this and other States of Change reports are those of the authors and not the institutions sponsoring the project.

### The project's goals are:

- To document and analyze the challenges to democracy posed by the rapid demographic evolution from the 1970s to 2060
- To project the race-ethnic composition of every state to 2060, which has not been done for 20 years
- To promote a wide-ranging and bipartisan discussion of America's demographic future and what it portends for the nation's political parties and public policy

Of course, shaping these outcomes is not the same as determining them. While the force of demography is important, election results also depend on economic conditions, candidates, and the extent to which those candidates are able to generate enthusiasm that can be measured in voter turnout and candidate preference. The analyses presented here build alternative scenarios for the election years mentioned above. Each scenario assumes the same projected demography of eligible voters, or EVs, for that year but makes different assumptions about voter turnout and candidate preference.

This report considers six main scenarios. Scenario A, here called the 2012 Forward scenario, assumes that for each age, race, and state group, voter turnout rates and Democratic/Republican candidate preferences in 2012 will continue for EV populations that are projected into the future. Scenario B, the 2008 Forward scenario, assumes that the even more Democrat-favorable turnout and candidate preference rates by age, race, and state group of the 2008 election will apply to future EV populations. Scenario C, the 2004 Forward scenario, assumes that the relatively Republican-favorable 2004 turnout rates and candidate preferences by age, race, and state will obtain among future EVs.

Scenario D is the Maximum Minority Turnout scenario. Like scenario A, it assumes that the candidate preferences of voters will follow those of 2012. But unlike A, it assumes that the turnout of Hispanics, Asians, and other races by age rises to the turnout level of whites by age in every state.<sup>4</sup> African American turnout is not adjusted since it was slightly higher than white turnout in 2012. This simulation shows the likely outcomes that would result if efforts to encourage the turnout of newer minorities—Hispanics, Asians, and other nonblack minorities—are extremely successful.

Scenarios E and F adjust scenario A to assume greater Republican voter preferences for different groups. Scenario E, the High GOP Hispanic/Asian Support scenario, assumes that Republican support from voters of each nonblack or new minority group—Hispanics, Asians, and those of other races—will increase by 7.5 percentage points for all age categories of those groups in every state. Note that raising the support rate for Republicans by 7.5 points among new minorities reduces the Democrats' support rate among these groups by the same amount, thereby improving the margin for Republicans by 15 points in total.

Scenario F, the More GOP White Support scenario, changes the voting preferences of the white electorate, adjusting scenario A in order to increase the level of Republican support from white voters of all age categories in every state by 5 points—thereby raising the GOP margin among all categories of white voters by 10 points.

Notably, these are simulations—not predictions. For example, when running the 2016 election simulation as if voter turnout and preferences were the same as in 2012—scenario A—the authors are not expressing the belief that this is a likely event. The goal of this report is to display the potential political effects of demographic change. As such, the results this report presents offer a range of outcomes that can be expected under different assumptions as the nation's demography changes, but they are not predictions about actual future events.

# Glossary

**Turnout rate:** This value is the percent of eligible voters in a group who voted during a given presidential election.

**Support rate:** Among those who voted, this value is the percent that voted for a candidate of a given political party.

**Vote margin:** This value is the difference between the percentage of Democratic support and Republican support in a given group. Positive values indicate more Democratic support than Republican, and negative values indicate the opposite. It is way of summarizing the advantage or disadvantage parties have relative to one another.

	Turnout rates	Support rates
Scenario A	2012 turnout	2012 support
Scenario B	2008 turnout	2008 support
Scenario C	2004 turnout	2004 support
Scenario D	2012 turnout for whites and blacks.	2012 support
	Hispanic, Asian, and other turnout equal to whites	
Scenario E	2012 turnout	2012 support for whites and blacks.
		15-point pro-Republican swing from 2012 support for Hispanics, Asians, and others.
Scenario F	2012 turnout	2012 support for minorities.
		10-point pro-Republican swing from 2012 support for whites

# The national popular vote

To underpin these simulations, we first look at the national popular vote in the past four presidential elections to see how both high and low turnout and differing candidate preferences interacted with demographic forces to elect President George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 and President Obama in 2008 and 2012. The more racially diverse electorate clearly helped President Obama, but strong enthusiasm among racial minorities—in terms of both turnout and preference—also helped his cause.

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## Overview of the national popular vote in the last four presidential elections: 2000–2012

The last four presidential elections produced two Republican wins—for President Bush in 2000 and 2004—and two Democratic wins—for President Obama in 2008 and 2012. The 2000 election was so close, however, that Democratic candidate and former Vice President Al Gore actually won the popular vote by a thin margin, even though he lost the Electoral College.

Table 1 underscores the dominant role that the combined racial minority vote played in electing President Obama by comparing his 2008 and 2012 victories with President Bush's 2004 victory. In 2004, minorities registered a Democratic net vote advantage of 12.9 million votes, which was overwhelmed by the white Republican net vote advantage of 16 million. This changed in the next two elections. In 2008 minorities delivered a net Democratic advantage of 21.2 million votes to counter the white net Republican vote advantage of 11.7 million. The minority Democratic net vote advantage increased to 23.5 million in 2012—again besting the white Republican advantage of 18.6 million.<sup>5</sup>



**TABLE 1**  
**Net popular vote differences**

	2000	2004	2008	2012
Whites*	-10,361	-16,008	-11,676	-18,555
Minorities*	10,908	12,996	21,225	23,540
Democratic vote margin*	547	-3,012	9,549	4,985
(Percent)	0.5	-2.5	7.3	3.9
Winning candidate	George W. Bush (R)	George W. Bush (R)	Barack Obama (D)	Barack Obama (D)
Losing candidate	Al Gore (D)	John Kerry (D)	John McCain (R)	Mitt Romney (R)


Notes: \* Indicates votes for Democratic candidate minus votes for Republican candidate, in 1000s.

Source: William H. Frey, "Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics are Remaking America" (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), based on analysis of national popular votes reported in David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, "Election Information," available at <http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/> (last accessed January 2016), and margins reported by Roper Center at Cornell University, "National Election Day Exit Polls," available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>.

Strong partisan vote advantages among whites and minorities are not new.<sup>6</sup> Whites have voted Republican in every presidential election since 1968; blacks have voted Democratic in every presidential election since the second term of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936—and especially strongly after 1960. Hispanics also are shown to be strongly Democratic as far back as data are available, though their level of support is not as high as that of blacks. Asians' leanings have been less consistent, with this demographic group only voting Democratic since 2000. But overall white-minority distinctions in Republican and Democratic preferences have been clearly important to election results for quite a while. This being the case, it would follow that the faster growth of minority populations compared with whites—both in the general population and the eligible voter population—has helped Democrats win recent elections, particularly those of President Obama.


As a share of all EVs, whites still dominated in 2012 but less so than in 2000, shrinking to 71 percent from 77 percent. (see Figure 1) Yet changing demographics are not the whole story behind President Obama's wins—two other factors were critical as well. One of these was the increased voting turnout of minority EVs. (see Figure 2) Black voter turnout was higher in both 2008 and 2012 than in any other presidential election since the U.S. Bureau of the Census first collected statistics in 1968. Black voter turnout also bested voter turnout among whites for the first time ever in 2012.<sup>7</sup> And while much lower than black turnout, Hispanic and Asian voter turnout in these two elections was higher than in any election since 1992. This helped drive the minority share of actual voters to 24 percent and 26 percent in 2008 and 2012, respectively, up from 19 percent in 2000 and 21 percent in 2004.<sup>8</sup>

**FIGURE 1**  
**Racial composition of eligible voters, 2000–2012**



Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>.


**FIGURE 2**  
**Presidential turnout rate among eligible voters by race, 2000–2012**



Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey* (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>.

The second factor that amplified the influence of minority groups on President Obama's two victories was the voting preference among minorities who did vote,<sup>9</sup> expressed in Figure 3 as Democratic minus Republican, or D-R, margins—in other words, the percent voting Democrat minus the percent voting Republican. Among minorities, D-R margins were accentuated in the last two elections. The 2008 and 2012 D-R margins for blacks were the highest in 40 years, according to historic exit polls.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, the 2012 white D-R margin—which favored Republicans—was the largest since 1984 when Ronald Reagan ran against Walter Mondale. But the combination of a higher share of eligible minority voters, a greater voter turnout among these EVs, and strong D-R voting margins among minorities was able to help provide Democratic victories in both 2008 and 2012.

**FIGURE 3**  
**Presidential vote margins by race, 2000–2012**




Note: Values displayed are the difference between the percent of a group that voted for the democratic candidate and the percent that voted for the republican candidate in a given year. Positive values indicate that the group voted more democratic than republican while negative values indicate the opposite.

Source: See Appendix B.


While racial shifts and voting dynamics tend to get the most attention, the general aging of the electorate and the rise of new generations have also influenced voting results. Figure 4 shows that as the Baby Boom generation has aged, the two older age categories combined—45 to 64 and 65 and older—increased their share of the electorate from 48 percent to 53 percent between 2000 and 2012. The fact that members of these groups turn out to vote at markedly higher rates than younger members of the electorate has enhanced their influence further. (see Figure 5)

**FIGURE 4**  
**Age composition of eligible voters, 2000–2012**



Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>.


**FIGURE 5**  
**Presidential turnout rate among eligible voters by age, 2000–2012**



Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey* (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>.

Age-related preferences for Democrats and Republicans have shown less consistency over time as different generations move into new age categories.<sup>11</sup> Yet a clear pattern has emerged over the past two presidential elections in which younger age groups are more prone to vote Democratic and older age groups—especially seniors age 65 and older—are more prone to vote Republican. For the near term, there is a racial dimension to these two trends in that heavily Democratic-voting minorities represent a much larger share of the younger population than of seniors, whereas Republican-voting whites represent a much larger share of the senior population. However, it should be noted that younger whites are also less prone to vote Republican than older whites, a tendency that—while accentuated by the attractiveness of President Obama as a candidate—fundamentally reflects different generational views about social issues and the role of government in domestic affairs.<sup>12</sup>

**FIGURE 6**  
**Presidential vote margins by age, 2000–2012**




Source: See Appendix B.

Clearly, the last four presidential elections have seen an electorate that has become more diverse, especially among younger age groups, with the rise of a new generation of voters and—acting as somewhat of a counterforce—a rise in the number of older potential voters. But, of course, Democratic victories in 2008 and 2012 were not the products of demographic shifts alone. Voter turnout and candidate preference among these demographic groups mattered just as much, if not more, in these elections.<sup>13</sup>


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## Alternative outcomes in the national popular vote: 2016, 2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032

The long-term effect of demographic change is important, even when turnout rates and demographic groups' candidate support vary over time. The changing demography of the national eligible electorate over the next five presidential elections by race and age, based on projections produced by the States of Change project, is shown in Figures 7 and 8.



**FIGURE 8**  
**Age composition of eligible voters, 2016–2032**



Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change>.

The racial composition of the eligible electorate should shift dramatically over the next five presidential elections. This is due not only to the rapid growth of newer minorities, Hispanics, and Asians compared with whites but also the coming of age of younger members of these racial groups as they turn 18 and become eligible to vote. Thus the combined minority population should represent 31 percent of eligible voters in 2016—compared with 23 percent in 2000—and rise to 40 percent by 2032. Also notable is the projected rise in the Hispanic portion of minority EVs. Hispanic EVs should outnumber black EVs by 2016 and should steadily widen their margin through 2032, when Hispanics should comprise 18 percent of EVs compared with 12.5 percent for blacks—nearly a 50 percent advantage. Over the same period, Asians and other races should increase their share of EVs from 7 percent to 10 percent.

The age structure of the electorate should also change as the Baby Boom generation grows older. The most marked shift is the projected rise in the age 65 and older portion of the electorate as the shares of young and middle-aged adults become smaller. Back in 2000, seniors represented 17.5 percent of EVs. This should rise to 21 percent by 2016 and to more than 25 percent by 2032, shares that will likely be magnified in the population that turns out to vote. In contrast, 18-to-29-year-olds—the prime age of today's Millennials—as well as those aged 30 to 44 and 45 to 64 will hold modestly shrinking shares of the eligible electorate over time.

As they are now, seniors will continue to be whiter than younger age groups over this period. However, due to the more diverse nature of the generations aging into their senior years, white senior EVs as a share of all EVs will rise by only a single percentage point—from 16 percent to 17 percent—over the 2016 to 2032 time period.

Looking to the future, a question can be raised: How much will these demographic shifts by themselves affect national popular vote outcomes under a variety of different voter turnout and candidate preference circumstances? To provide an answer, the authors performed a number of different simulations, each of which assume that the nation's underlying EV demography will change according to race and age projections in every state. The simulations differ only in what voter turnout and Democratic/Republican preferences are assumed for race and age groups in the various states. The results, aggregated to the national level, are displayed in Figures 9 and 10. We performed dozens of different simulations, but the report only covers six in detail; these six illustrate particularly well the possible interplay between ongoing demographic change and shifts in turnout and candidate preference.

Scenario A, here called the 2012 Forward scenario, assumes that, for each age, race, and state group, voter turnout rates and Democratic/Republican candidate preferences in 2012 will continue for EV populations that are projected into the future. Scenario B, the 2008 Forward scenario, assumes that the even more Democrat-favorable turnout and candidate preference rates by age, race, and state group of the 2008 election will apply to future EV populations. Scenario C, the 2004 Forward scenario, assumes that the relatively Republican-favorable 2004 turnout rates and candidate preferences by age, race, and state will obtain among future EVs.

While the previous three scenarios project ahead the race- and age-specific turnout rates and party/candidate preferences by state observed in earlier elections, three additional projections make new modifications to scenario A that change assumptions about either turnout rates or party/candidate preferences.

Scenario D is the Maximum Minority Turnout scenario. Like scenario A, it assumes that the candidate preference of voters will follow those of 2012. But unlike A, it assumes that the turnout of Hispanics, Asians, and other races by age rises to the turnout level of whites by age in every state.<sup>14</sup> Black turnout is not adjusted since, as discussed above, it was slightly higher than white turnout in 2012. This simulation shows the likely outcomes that would result if efforts to encourage the turnout of newer minorities—Hispanics, Asians, and other non-black minorities—are extremely successful.

Scenarios E and F adjust scenario A to assume greater Republican voter preferences for different groups. Scenario E, the High GOP Hispanic/Asian Support scenario, assumes that Republican support from voters of each nonblack or new minority group—Hispanics, Asians, and those of other races—will increase by 7.5 percentage points for all age categories of those groups in every state. Note that raising the support rate for Republicans by 7.5 points among new minorities reduces the Democrats’ support rate among these groups by the same amount, thereby improving the margin for Republicans by 15 points in total.

Using the national results from 2012 as a simplified example, scenario E would be equivalent to assuming that Latinos, rather than voting 71 percent to 27 percent in favor of Democrats as they did in 2012—a 44-point margin—would have instead voted 63.5 percent to 34.5 percent, a margin of just 29 points, or 15 points lower. This scenario, projected into the future, is meant to show how a greater appeal of Republicans to minorities might affect election outcomes.

Scenario F, the More GOP White Support scenario, changes the voting preferences of the white electorate, adjusting scenario A to increase the level of Republican support from white voters of all age categories in every state by 5 points—thereby raising the GOP margin among all categories of white voters by 10 points. Using the 2012 national results again as a simple example, this is equivalent to assuming that whites, who voted Republican by 18 points in 2012<sup>15</sup>—58 percent to 40 percent—would have voted Republican by 28 points, or 63 percent to 35 percent. Note that this margin is almost exactly the same as Ronald Reagan’s advantage among whites in his historic landslide victory in 1984.<sup>16</sup>


This scenario implicitly amplifies the influence of older whites as the large mostly white Baby Boomers move into older age groups where Republican support was already strong in 2012. Although this scenario continues to maintain the strong turnout and Democratic support from minorities that President Obama obtained in 2012, it can be thought of as a best case Republican scenario given the greater Republican support it assumes among the still very large white segment of the electorate.

## 2016 national popular vote scenarios

Of most immediate interest is how the different scenarios play out for the 2016 election. As might be expected, scenarios A and B—which attribute turnout and candidate-support measures from 2012 and 2008 to an electorate with demo-



graphic attributes that should be even more favorable to Democrats—yields even higher D-R margins for 2016, 4.8 percentage points in the 2012 Forward scenario and 8.6 points in the 2008 Forward scenario, than seen back in the 2012 and 2008 elections, 3.9 points and 7.3 percent points, respectively.



Results from scenario C, the more Republican-favorable 2004 Forward scenario, are quite different. Here, when 2004 turnout and candidate-support measures are applied to 2016 demographics, there is only a very small Democratic win in the national popular vote—a D-R margin of 0.1 percentage points. This is an even smaller margin of victory than in 2000, when Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore won the national popular vote but lost in the Electoral College. (Interestingly, here too the Democrats see a slight Electoral College loss, despite their popular vote win. This is discussed in the next section.) Thus, the projected change in the demography of the electorate for 2016 would not yield the solid popular vote Republican win that President George W. Bush enjoyed in 2004—despite matching his turnout and support numbers from that year.

Scenario D, the Maximum Minority Turnout scenario, yields a 2016 D-R margin—6.1 percentage points—that is predictably larger than the 2012 Forward scenario. This is because, in this scenario, more Hispanics, Asians, and other nonblack minorities turn out to vote. Yet the 2016 outcome from this scenario still yields a smaller D-R margin than scenario B, essentially the Democratic best case, which assumes lower white Republican candidate support, as well as other attributes from 2008.

Scenario E, the High GOP Hispanic/Asian Support scenario, shaves the 2012 Forward scenario margin substantially but still leaves the Democrats with a 2.5-point margin in the popular vote. Thus, a considerable rise in new minority Republican support does not eliminate a projected Democratic advantage in the popular vote under 2012 Forward conditions. Even twinning the projected 7.5-point increase in GOP new minority support with an equal increase in black GOP support does not produce a GOP win in the national popular vote, though the deficit is significantly smaller at 0.5 percentage points. It should be noted, however, that this scenario is not shown.


In scenario F, the More GOP White Support scenario, the story is different. Here, a strong increase in Republican support among white voters gives Republicans a projected popular vote advantage of 2.5 points for 2016, even if other 2012 attributes hold. It is the only one of the six scenarios summarized above that produces a GOP popular vote victory for 2016. It is worth noting that a scenario where GOP white support increases 4 points rather than 5 points also produces a Republican popular vote advantage, albeit a very narrow one.

Note also that if the projected increases in GOP white support and Hispanic/Asian support in the six scenarios are deemed unrealistic, it is possible to combine more modest increases in Republican support among these groups to produce hybrid scenarios with more favorable outcomes for that party. For example, if a projected increase in GOP white support of 3 points is combined with an increase of 5 points in Hispanic, Asian, and other race support, the result is a narrow GOP win of 1.1 points in the national popular vote.

### [National popular vote scenarios: 2020–2032](#)

The six basic scenarios also are used to project four subsequent presidential elections—2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032. Since Democrats registered popular vote advantages in the A, B, C, D, and E scenarios in 2016, it should be no surprise that they do so for these later years as well. In these projections, Democrats achieve even greater margins in each subsequent election as the projected demographic makeup of the eligible electorate continues to shift in a direction generally favorable to Democrats.

**FIGURE 10**  
**National vote margins by simulation, 2016–2032**



Note: Values displayed are the difference between the percent of a group that voted for the democratic candidate and the percent that voted for the republican candidate in a given year. Positive values indicate that the group voted more democratic than republican while negative values indicate the opposite.

Source: See Appendix B.

It is useful to look more closely at scenario C, which moves forward the turnout and voting preferences that re-elected President George W. Bush in 2004. This scenario yields Democratic popular vote wins in each of these four presidential elections, with increasing D-R margins ranging from 1.0 percent in 2020 to 3.4 percent in 2032. Thus, even when assuming the Republican-favorable turnout and preference patterns of 2004—the relatively high voter turnout for whites and relatively low voter turnout and Democratic voting preferences for minorities and young people—the ongoing cumulative shifts in demographic structure lead to Democratic advantages in the popular vote.

The results are different with the Republican best case, scenario F, which assumes elevated Republican support among an aging white population. Just as in 2016, this scenario shows Republican popular vote advantages in 2020 and 2024, though by diminishing margins, followed by Democratic advantages in 2028 and 2032, with D-R margins of 1.1 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. Thus, even assuming scenario F’s very strong white Republican voting preferences—at the level of Reagan in 1984—the increased racial diversity of voters, especially among the young, should eventually be enough to shift the projected national popular vote to the Democrats.

# The states and projected electoral college votes

Most relevant to the outcomes of presidential elections are the state-level results that determine which party achieves a majority in the Electoral College. As the 2000 election of President George W. Bush made plain, it is possible to lose the national popular vote but still win the required 270 or more electoral votes.

This section provides Electoral College results for the alternative election scenarios described in the previous section. In addition to providing overall Electoral College outcomes, our projections also show what different scenarios imply for the identification of swing states or other states that might be in play for 2016 and future elections. Each scenario for a given year suggests a different set of swing states, as well as solid blue and red states in the Democratic and Republican camps.


Before presenting these future Electoral College projections, we give an overview of the eligible voter demographics, turnout patterns, and D-R margins that led to Electoral College outcomes in the four previous presidential elections. Special attention is paid to the changing demographics across states, as well as variations across states in white and minority D-R voter margins.

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## State electorates and Electoral College outcomes in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012


Figure 11 displays state outcomes for the past four elections. These outcomes show changes in the geography of political support between the two Republican wins of President George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 and the two Democratic wins of President Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. The former elections exhibited a pattern of Republican dominance in the South, Great Plains, and Mountain West. Democrats in those elections, by contrast, showed greater strength in urbanized coastal states, New England, and in much of the industrial Midwest. The Democrat-held states also included large states such as California, New York, Pennsylvania,

and Illinois, which helped make these elections very close. But Republicans seemed at the time to have a potential long-term demographic advantage, since many of the states they won were fast growing states in the nation's Sun Belt, poised to gain greater electoral votes as a result of future census reapportionment.



This picture changed in 2008 and 2012, as Democrats carried a number of Sun Belt states—notably, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Nevada, and Colorado. Shifting political geography also can be seen by noting the states that moved from strong Republican status to either Democratic or Republican swing state status—a margin of 7.5 points or less—such as Georgia, Montana, North Carolina, and Virginia, and those that moved from Republican swing state to Democratic swing status, such as Colorado, Nevada, and Florida. In addition, several Northeast and Midwest states made the same Republican to Democratic swing state shift, including Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio.

Although these transitions from Republican to Democratic wins among affected states reflect a variety of factors, including the appeal and strength of particular candidates and the nation's economic circumstances, the shifts in the demographics of the eligible electorate are also important. The two major shifts are: the dispersal of newer minorities—Hispanics and Asians—into different parts of the country, especially the South and Mountain West, and a shift of blacks to prosperous states in the South.<sup>17</sup> The effect these shifts have had on the eligible electorate are depicted in Figure 12.




In 2000, eight states and Washington, D.C., had minority shares of eligible voters that exceeded 30 percent, including Hawaii, New Mexico, Texas, California, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Maryland. By 2012, minorities comprised at least 30 percent of EVs in 17 states and the District of Columbia. New to the list were Nevada, New York, Arizona, Florida, New Jersey, South Carolina, Alaska, North Carolina, and Virginia. Shifts were especially large in the 2012 swing states of Nevada, Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina, as well as in the 2012 solid Republican states of Arizona, Texas, and Georgia. In most of these states, the growth of Hispanics, Asians, and other races has made significant contributions.

At the same time, the eligible electorates of many slow-growing and whiter states experienced accentuated aging. The Midwest swing states of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio gained more than 5 percentage points in their age 45 and over electorates, with those voters now comprising more than 53 percent of total EVs in these states.

However, these demographic shifts are only part of the story. As with the national popular vote, winning individual states depends importantly on voter turnout patterns and candidate preferences of the various demographic groups. Turnout rates differ across states, of course, though there are some commonalities. Typically, older EVs turn out at greater rates than younger EVs, and the white eligible electorate turns out at higher rates than the combined minority electorate. Yet the minority eligible electorate is not monolithic. Blacks tend to have higher turnout rates than other minority groups—and in recent presidential elections, their turnout rates have often been higher than those of whites.

Different state experiences are shown in Figure 13, which displays voter turnout rates for major racial groups in the previous four presidential elections. The four states shown are the highly diverse states of Florida, North Carolina, and Nevada, as well as the mostly white state of Ohio. Each are considered swing states that went for President George W. Bush in both 2000 and 2004 but for President Barack Obama in one or both of his victories. In all four states, whites had higher voter turnout rates than all minority groups in 2004. Yet this changed in more recent elections, especially in Nevada, North Carolina, and Ohio, where black turnout rose above white turnout in one or both of the last two presidential elections. Notable Hispanic gains were also shown in these elections for North Carolina, Nevada, and Florida. In the latter state, Hispanic turnout equaled white turnout and exceeded black turnout in 2012. Overall, the rise in turnout for blacks and Hispanics magnified the clout of these voters in these states, as well as in the Electoral College.

**FIGURE 13**  
**Turnout rate among eligible voters by race, 2000–2012**



Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey* (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>.

The final piece of the Electoral College equation is the voting preferences of those who did turn out to vote. Here, the long-held racial preference patterns discussed earlier generally hold up across states, with minorities favoring Democrats and whites favoring Republicans. In the 2012 elections, blacks voted Democratic in all states, with D-R margins ranging from 59 percentage points to 98 percentage points. The highest Democratic margins—of 90 points or higher—were seen in a swath of states in the Northeast and Midwest, including New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, as well as California, Colorado, Washington, Nevada, and North Carolina. The black D-R margin was lower than 70 points in only 5 states—New Mexico, Utah, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and Maine.


Hispanics also favored Democrats in most states in 2012; they gave Republicans a modest advantage in just Wyoming, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. Still, there was wider variation across states in terms of Democratic support from Hispanics than from blacks, ranging from D-R margins of 11 points in Idaho to 78 points in Pennsylvania. The highest margins—above 50 points—were found in the District of Columbia and 14 states other than Pennsylvania, including California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and North Carolina. There was a wide range in Democratic support among other states with large Hispanic populations, with Texas at 17 points, Florida at 30 points, and Arizona at 45 points.



Although the Asian population is still a small part of the electorate in most states, it leaned Democratic in every state but Mississippi. In states with relatively large Asian populations, 2012 D-R margins included 59 points for California; 54 points for New York; 51 points for Hawaii; 38 points for Washington state, Nevada, and Virginia; and 30 points for Texas.

But the leanings and party/candidate voting margins of the white population, still the dominant racial group in most states—especially among EVs—are undeniably critical for the results of future elections. Just as the national white population has voted consistently for Republican candidates, so too have whites in most states. But more so than with minorities, this is not the case across the board. In 2000, 2004, and 2012, whites living in the District of Columbia, as well as in 10 to 12 other states, favored Democratic candidates. (see Figure 14 for 2012 data) These included most of the New England states, New York, Washington state, Minnesota and, in some years, California, Oregon, New Jersey, Iowa, and Hawaii. In 2008, when President Barack Obama had his strongest showing, whites in 18 states and the District of Columbia voted Democratic. These included the additional states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Delaware, and Colorado.

**FIGURE 14**  
**White vote margin, 2012**



Note: Values displayed are the difference between the percent of Whites that voted for the democratic candidate and the percent that voted for the republican candidate. Positive values indicate that they voted more democratic than republican while negative values indicate the opposite.

Source: See Appendix B.

At the other extreme is a band of states where white populations have consistently voted strongly for Republicans. This includes a good part of the South and some states in both the Mountain West and Great Plains. South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas have typically shown D-R margins

in the minus 40 points and below range, with Louisiana showing minus 71 points in 2012. Whites in other states, such as Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, as well as North Dakota and South Dakota, are in the minus 20 percentage point to minus 40 percentage point ranges. A third group of states include those in the industrial Midwest, the Northeast, and parts of the West, where white Republican margins are fairly small or occasionally lean Democratic.

The wide variation in white negative D-R margins across states points to opportunities for both parties to make gains in the future. For Democrats, the more modest Republican leanings of whites in much of the Midwest have helped them win states, including Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, which have relatively small minority populations. Less severe deficits among whites also have helped Democrats in some Southern and Western states, such as Virginia, North Carolina, Colorado, and Nevada, which have large, rapidly growing minority populations. Republicans, by contrast, continue to exert a strong hold on most Deep South states where Republicans completely dominate the white vote—despite these states' sizable or rapidly growing black and Hispanic populations.

Of course, the interaction between changing demographics and white voting margins can and does change over time. States such as Georgia, Texas, and Arizona—which have continued to support Republican presidential candidates due to their sizable white Republican voting margins—are poised to see rapid growth in their heavily Democratic-leaning minority populations. If this growth takes place—and projections indicate that it will—it is possible that the minority vote could make these states much more competitive than they currently are, despite their substantial white Republican voting margins. A similar argument could be made for other Southern states, including Tennessee and South Carolina, as well as Western states, including Montana and Idaho.

By the same token, the somewhat slower demographic change in the whiter Northern states stretching from Iowa and east to Pennsylvania may put their current Democratic leanings in jeopardy. Their relatively small white Republican margins—which typically have been countered by the relatively high turnout and Democratic votes of minorities—could rise in the future as more white Baby Boomers age into their senior years. The aging of this generation should increase its turnout rates, as well as, possibly, its tendency to favor Republican candidates. If so, this aging pattern could potentially add to Republican white voting margins in these states, providing a significant countervailing force to other Democrat-friendly demographic changes, which tend to be relatively modest in these states.

This, however, depends crucially on whether many liberal white Baby Boomers in their senior years replicate the voting behavior of current white seniors, who are primarily drawn from the notably conservative Silent Generation.<sup>18</sup> In these simulations, we assume this to be the case and allow age to outweigh generation in projected political behavior. To the extent this is not the case, the pro-Republican effect of aging white Baby Boomers could be attenuated.

For example, if one allows for cohort effects from generational replacement in the white voting pool so that the white vote by age becomes somewhat more liberal over time, the GOP does not gain a slight popular vote win in 2016 from a white swing of 4 points. Instead, the GOP suffers a slight loss. And a white swing of 5 points toward the GOP yields a popular vote victory for the Republicans only in 2016, favoring the Democrats thereafter.

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
## Changing state demographics and alternative Electoral College outcomes in 2016, 2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032

This section presents alternative projections of Electoral College outcomes for the 2016 presidential election, as well as the four subsequent elections from 2020 to 2032, using the various assumptions about demographic group turnout and party/candidate preferences embedded in scenarios A through F. Indicated in each case is whether the Democratic or Republican candidate would win under a given scenario in a given year. In addition, each simulation identifies those states that can be thought of as swing or competitive states in each election.

While the race, age, and state turnout rates and voter preferences remain the same for all elections in any given simulation, the underlying eligible voter demography of all states shift in each future presidential year using the projections from the States of Change project.

Figure 15 provides an overview of the changes in each state's minority population between 2016 and 2032.

**FIGURE 15**  
**Percent minority among eligible voters, 2016 and 2032**



Sharp increases in diversity can be highlighted by looking at those states where more than 40 percent of the eligible electorate should be comprised of racial minorities. In 2016, there should be six states over this threshold: three states, in addition to the District of Columbia, where minorities are more than half of EVs—Hawaii, New Mexico and, for the first time, California—along with Texas, Maryland, and Georgia, where minorities will be between 40 percent and 50 percent of EVs. By 2032, 14 states and the District of Columbia should have crossed the 40 percent threshold, including: Arizona, Alaska, New Jersey, Nevada, Florida, Mississippi, New York, and Louisiana. By then, three additional states should have majority-minority eligible electorates: Texas in 2019, Nevada in 2030, and Maryland in 2031.

At the other end of the continuum, the number of states where whites exceed 80 percent of EVs should be reduced from 23 states in 2016 to just 11 states in 2032. In 2032, the latter still heavily white states should include the three upper New England states of Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire; the Southern states of West Virginia and Kentucky; the Midwestern states of North Dakota, Iowa, and Wisconsin; and the Western states of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming. It should be noted that, by 2032, the traditionally very white state of Utah should no longer be part of this group, as racial minorities will comprise 23 percent of its EV population due to the projected dispersion of Hispanics and other racial groups throughout the state.

Looking more closely at the demographic projections of selected Southern and Western swing states, it is clear that the Hispanic presence in particular should become quite a bit stronger in several of these states, including Nevada and Florida, where Latinos are projected to become nearly one-quarter or more of the eligible electorate in 2032. (see Figure 16) Due to this and substantial gains by Asians and other races, Nevada's white share of EVs should plummet from 62 percent in 2016 to just 48 percent in 2032. North Carolina and Virginia should maintain their sizable black electorates and also show significantly increased shares of other minorities. This is also the case for Georgia—a swing state in waiting—whose 2032 eligible electorate will be one-third black and 15 percent other minorities. And two other potential swing states, Texas and Arizona, display sharp drops in their white EV profiles, with substantial gains among Hispanics and other races.

Several Northern swing states show smaller gains in diversity. In 2032, Iowa's EVs will still be 85 percent white; Wisconsin's will be 81 percent white; and Ohio's will be 78 percent white. All three states, as well as several of their Northern counterparts, will also be older than their counterparts in the South and West. This could make them more competitive for Republicans if white seniors maintain their voting preferences despite generational turnover in this age group.

**FIGURE 16**  
**Racial composition of eligible voters, 2016–2032**





FIGURE 16 (continued)




Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change>.

## 2016 electoral college scenarios


The results of our six scenarios at the state level appear in Figures 17 and 18. The first thing to note is that the final Electoral College outcomes for 2016 do not exactly match those projected for the popular vote shown in Figure 9. The difference is that scenario C—the 2004 Forward scenario—yields a Republican Electoral College win. However, each of the other Electoral College scenarios yields the same final outcome as the national popular vote: Democratic wins for scenarios A, B, D, and E and a Republican win for scenario F.

Perhaps most informative are the swing states associated with each election—both how they switch across party lines and how they move between swing and solid status across parties. It should first be noted that, although scenario A—the 2012 Forward scenario—yields the exact same outcome in 2016 as in the 2012 election in terms of electoral votes—332 Democrat versus 206 Republican—Nevada changes status from swing state to solid Democratic. Georgia also changes status from solid Republican to swing state. This reflects the effect of changing electoral demographics between 2012 and 2016.





**FIGURE 18**  
**Election results by simulation, 2016**



Source: See Appendix B.

Still, even when the same 2016 demographic makeup is assumed, the different simulation scenarios yield a wide array of swing states. At one extreme is scenario B—the 2008 Forward scenario, and the one most favorable to Democrats—which brings 29 states plus the District of Columbia into the Democratic fold, including 25 that are solid blue, compared with 21 states favoring Republicans, including 19 that are solid red. Counted among the solid blue states are Virginia, New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Nevada. Missouri and Indiana are among the Democratic swing states.

At the other extreme is scenario F, the More White GOP Support scenario, which puts 33 states into the Republican column—including 23 that are solid red states—compared with just 18 states favoring the Democratic candidate, 12 of which are solid blue. Among the red states are a substantial number of Midwest and Northeast swing states, including Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, as well as the Sun Belt states of Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, and Colorado. Among the blue states with swing status under this scenario are Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, and Oregon. The shift toward Republican wins in a host of Northern, slower-growing, whiter states indicates what could happen if their relatively small 2012 white Republican margins widen.

Two other 2016 scenarios are of particular note. First is scenario D, the Maximum Minority Turnout scenario, which assumes greater new minority voter turnout than observed in 2012. With this scenario, Democrats do not pick up any additional electoral votes from scenario A. However, this scenario does make the Democratic swing states of Wisconsin and Colorado shift to solid blue. It also changes Arizona's status from solid red to a Republican swing state.

A second noteworthy 2016 simulation is scenario E, the High GOP Hispanic/Asian Support scenario. It shows that even with a substantial increase in support for Republicans among new minority groups, the Democrats would still win the Electoral College vote if all else from 2012 were to remain the same. The only state that shifts into the Republican column compared with scenario A is Florida. Still, this scenario does turn Minnesota and Nevada—solid blue states under scenario A—into Democratic swing states.

In sum, the shifting demographic landscape favors Democrats in 2016, particularly if recent turnout rates and Democratic/Republican voting proclivities hold for race and age groups in the various states. Even a trend toward substantially greater Republican voting among Hispanics and Asians—or even all minorities—does not alter the Electoral College bottom line.

However, the effect of these trends can be more successfully mitigated for Republicans if, for example, turnout and voter preference patterns approximate those obtained in the 2004 election, in which case an Electoral College victory—though not popular vote victory—might be the result. More directly, the shift that would make the most difference is a substantial rise in Republican voting among whites, a group that is already firmly in the Republican camp in most states. Alternatively, a more modest rise in white support for the GOP could be twinned with a solid increase in Hispanic and Asian support to yield a narrow Republican Electoral College victory. Key in these instances is expanding GOP white margins in a number of previously blue Midwestern and Northern states, where current white Republican margins are comparatively modest.

### [Electoral college scenarios: 2020–2032](#)

Like any simulations, those shown for the 2016 election are based on assumptions that can only approximate to a greater or lesser degree the turnout and voter preference patterns we ultimately see in that election. This caution is even more appropriate for simulated electoral results that are farther in the future. Probably the safest part of these simulations are the assumptions about the underlying race and age makeup of the electorate. The assumptions about voter turnout and party/candidate preferences among these race and age voting groups are more likely to vary from real world patterns. Nonetheless, given the broad net we cast with the diverse assumptions of scenarios A through F, it is useful to see how each of these scenarios play out in light of probable demographic changes over the next 16 years. These longer term Electoral College projections under each scenario are summarized in Figures 19 and 20.

**FIGURE 19**  
**Election results by simulation, 2020 and 2032**






FIGURE 19 (continued)



Source: See Appendix B.

**FIGURE 20**  
**Electoral college results by simulation, 2016–2032**



Note: Values displayed are the difference between the number of electoral college votes captured by the democratic candidate and the republican candidate in any given simulation and year. Positive values indicate that democrats would receive more electoral college votes than republicans and negative values indicate the opposite.

Source: See Appendix B.

### *Scenario A: 2012 Forward*

The steady state assumption that 2012 turnout and voting preferences for each race, age, and state group hold in the future yields increasingly large Democratic gains. A projected 347 to 191 Electoral College win in 2020 rises to a 361 to 177 victory by 2032. Georgia moves into the Democratic column in 2028. In addition, several other Republican states—including Missouri, Indiana, Alaska, Mississippi, and South Carolina—switch from solid red to Republican swing states over this time period. Colorado and Pennsylvania move from swing to solid blue status.

### *Scenario B: 2008 Forward*

This scenario—the best case for Democrats—pushes ahead the strong minority Democratic and weak white Republican performances of the 2008 election and applies them to projected demographic changes in the eligible electorate. An already strong projected Democratic 2020 Electoral College win of 368 to 170 increases to 382 to 156 by 2032 with the addition of Georgia in 2024. As shown in Figure 19, several states shift from solid red to swing Republican over this period, most notably Texas but also South Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Mississippi. By 2032, Florida moves from a Democratic swing state to a solid blue state.

### *Scenario C: 2004 Forward*

This scenario pushes ahead the race, age, and state turnout and voting preferences associated with President George W. Bush’s 2004 win. As in the 2016 projection discussed above, it yields another Republican win in 2020. However, in the 2024, 2028, and 2032 projected Electoral College outcomes, the GOP-favorable 2004 turnout and voting preference patterns are not enough to counter the power of

the underlying demographic shifts in the eligible electorate. As a consequence, the Republican Electoral College win of 275 to 263 in 2020 is reversed to a Democratic electoral vote victory of 275 to 263 in 2024—an advantage that rises to 285 to 253 in 2032. The states shifting to the Democratic column as this scenario advances include Ohio in 2024 and Colorado in 2032. Still, several swing states continue to vote Republican through 2032 in this scenario, including Virginia, Florida, and North Carolina.

#### *Scenario D: Maximum Minority Turnout*

This scenario makes the same assumptions as scenario A except that all nonblack minorities turn out at the same rate as whites for every race, age, and state group. As such, much like scenario A, the Democratic Electoral College wins continue for each election from 2020 to 2032 but with a bigger electoral vote total in 2028 and 2032. In 2020 and 2024, scenario D does not pick up any additional states relative to scenario A, but it does bring a few red states into the Republican swing state category: Indiana and Alaska in 2024. By 2028, scenario D moves Arizona and Georgia into the Democratic column, leading to Electoral College wins of 373 to 165 in both 2028 and 2032.

#### *Scenario E: High GOP Hispanic/Asian Support*

This scenario modifies scenario A to look at whether and to what extent substantially greater support for Republicans among new minority voters—plus 7.5 percentage points—would lead to Republican wins in the Electoral College. The result of these simulations indicates that, compared with scenario A, there is a closing of the Democratic/Republican electoral vote difference for the elections in 2020, 2024, and 2028 but not for 2032. Still, there is no reversal of Democratic victories for each election between 2020 and 2032. In 2020, the Democratic victory under this scenario—303 to 235—is smaller than under scenarios A, B, or D, as Republicans win Florida and North Carolina. However, in subsequent elections, the Democratic Electoral College advantage continues to grow larger, so that by 2032, the Democratic electoral vote margin—361 to 177—is exactly the same as the projection in scenario A. Over time, North Carolina, Florida, and Georgia switch from Republican to Democratic states, irrespective of this increased Republican minority support.

### *Scenario F: More GOP White Support*

This scenario modifies scenario A to look at whether and to what extent greater support for Republicans among whites—plus 5 points—would lead to Republican Electoral College victories. As noted in the 2016 projections above, this Republican best case scenario yielded a decisive Republican win in that election, as a number of states in the nation’s Midwest, Northeast, and South that voted Democratic in recent elections became Republican.

Projecting ahead, this scenario indicates that Republicans would maintain their Electoral College advantage from 2016 in 2020, 2024, and 2028.<sup>19</sup> But in 2032, even the assumption of an additional 5 percentage points of Republican support among whites—which would affect the large contingents of aging whites in many slow-growing states—would not be enough to counter the likely electoral effects of growth in Democratic-leaning minorities. Specifically, the Republican Electoral College edge of 325 to 213 in 2020 shrinks to 277 to 261 in 2028 and finally reverses to a Democratic win of 287 to 251 in 2032. Over the course of these elections, several states reverse from Republican to Democratic: Colorado, Minnesota, and Virginia in 2024; Pennsylvania in 2028; and Wisconsin and North Carolina in 2032. Still, under this scenario, the swing states of Ohio, Florida, Iowa, and New Hampshire remain in the Republican column through all of these elections, while Nevada and New Mexico remain in the Democratic column.

In sum, these longer-term projections once again show that shifting demographics currently favor Democrats if current race, age, and state turnout and voting proclivities continue. As we have seen, however, when 2004 conditions are assumed—relatively low minority turnout and Democratic support along with relatively high white turnout and Republican support—the simulations yield small Republican Electoral College wins in both 2016 and 2020. And when a strong increase in Republican preference among whites is assumed, even with other 2012 conditions held constant, simulations indicate that Republicans could obtain and keep an electoral vote advantage over a number of cycles, despite underlying demographic changes that favor Democrats.



# Conclusion

This report has assessed the potential electoral effect of shifting race and age demographics under a variety of different scenarios. It is clear that this effect is likely to be significant but that neither party can be assured of long-term dominance simply from shifting demographics. Indeed, the simulations in this report also show the potentially strong effect of shifts in party preference and turnout among various demographic groups.

As a result, both parties will have considerable work to do in order to adjust to the changing structure of the eligible electorate. While shifting demographics favor Democrats when all else is held equal, the party has significant vulnerability among aging white voters, who will remain quite important in slow-growing Midwestern and Rust Belt swing states. Democrats will therefore have to think hard about how to balance appeals to their growing and younger minority base with outreach to older white voters—particularly in Middle America.

On the other hand, Republicans face a clear need to enhance their appeal to America's rapidly growing minority population—especially the new minorities of Hispanics and Asians. If they do not, Republicans risk putting themselves into a box where they become ever more dependent on a declining white population—particularly its older segment. As the simulations show, even under generous assumptions of enhanced white support, GOP electoral fortunes ultimately could be undermined by shifting demographics. The prudent course may very well be to adapt now, rather than later, to onrushing demographic change.

# Methodology

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## Eligible voter projections

The States of Change population projections employ a multistate cohort component methodology that begins with the 2010 census and projects ahead in five-year intervals for race- and age-specific populations for each state to 2060 based on the components of domestic migration, international migration, fertility, and mortality. The projections are based on modeling techniques developed by demographer Andrei Rogers.<sup>20</sup> These projections are performed separately for racial groups, wherein the states' domestic migration flows are projected between the state and the remainder of the four census regions: the Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the West. International migration to the United States for each interval is allocated to states and regions. In both cases, these migration flows and immigration allocations are based on patterns recorded in the 2007 to 2012 multiyear American Community Survey. Race-specific fertility and mortality rates for each state assume national rates specific to age and race.

Using those projections as a baseline, we also employ a demographically based eligibility projection model. The first step in this process was taking data from multiple years of the American Community Survey and dividing up the American population into groups based on state, race, and age—for example, Hispanics ages 30 to 34 in Colorado. We then use multilevel statistical models to estimate the unique eligibility rates—the rate of citizenship among a given group—and naturalization rates—the rate at which these groups gained citizenship over time—for each state, race, and age group. These groups were then tracked forward in time and had those unique naturalization rates applied to them as they moved into older age groups. Additionally, these estimates account for the influx of immigrants into each state, race, and age group, as well as the effect they have on those groups' overall eligibility rates. The end result is a procedure that is sensitive to the different rates of naturalization each of these groups experience, as well as the immigration each state is predicted to experience in the future.

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## Determining turnout rates

For scenarios A through F, the U.S. EV population was broken down into 1,020 groups—five racial categories broken down by four age groups in each of the 51 geographies—and had a unique turnout rate estimated based on those characteristics. Below is a summary of how those turnout rates were estimated for each scenario.

### Scenarios A, D, E, and F

The turnout rate for each state, race, and age group was estimated using data from the 2012 November Supplement of the Current Population Survey and multilevel modeling techniques. This approach provides more accurate estimates of turnout for low-sample populations by partially pooling data across individuals' geographic and demographic characteristics.

Scenario D uses these same values except that the turnout rates for Hispanics, Asians, and those of other race are set equal to the turnout rate for whites of the same age group in that state. For example, the turnout rate of Hispanics ages 18 to 29 in California was set equal to the turnout rate of Whites ages 18 to 29 in California. We determined this to be superior to simply making the turnout rates for each racial group the same because it paints a more realistic picture of what equal turnout would mean in a situation where the age distributions of different racial groups differ.

### Scenarios B and C

The same procedure described above was implemented using different sources of data. The turnout rates used in scenarios B and C were estimated using, respectively, the 2008 and 2004 November Supplement of the Current Population Survey.

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## Determining support rates

### Scenarios A, D, E, and F

Starting with data from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we derived Democratic and Republican support rates for each race and age group in all 50 states and the District of Columbia using multilevel modeling techniques. This approach provides more accurate estimates of support for low-sample popu-

lations by partially pooling data across individuals' geographic and demographic characteristics. We then incorporated data from the 2012 November Supplement of the Current Population Survey, the National Election Pool's 2012 Exit Polls, and 2012 state-level elections results to harmonize these state-level group estimates with other observable features of the 2012 election and electorate.

This process is important because many other popular estimates of support rates either generate election results that deviate from the true election results when combined with plausible turnout rates or propose implausible turnout rates. For example, if we simply combine support rates from the National Election Pool's exit polls with turnout rates derived from the Current Population Survey—widely considered the gold standard for determining turnout rates among demographic groups—we would find that the results varied significantly from observed election outcomes.

The end results of the process employed in this report are support rates that are specific down to the state level and completely compatible with the best estimates we have for group turnout rates and election results in the 2012 election.

For scenarios E and F, the support rates are adjusted from those 2012 baselines to simulate shifts among various racial groups. In scenario E, the Democratic support rate among Hispanics, Asians, and others declines 7.5 points in each state, race, and age group, and the Republican support rate increases by 7.5 points—a 15-point swing. In scenario F, the Democratic support rate among whites declines 5 points in each state, race, and age group, and the Republican support rate increases by 5 points—a 10-point swing.

## Scenarios B and C

The support rates for scenarios B and C are estimated using essentially the same procedures but with different data. The main data sources for scenarios B and C are, respectively, the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and the National Election Pool's 2004 Exit Polls.

# Appendix A

**TABLE A1**  
**Voting margins and electoral votes for presidential elections by simulation, 2016–2032**

	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
<b>Scenario A "2012 Forward"</b>					
Democratic electoral votes	332	347	345	361	361
Republican electoral votes	206	191	193	177	177
Vote margin	4.8	5.7	6.7	7.6	8.6
<b>Scenario B "2008 Forward"</b>					
Democratic electoral votes	368	368	382	382	382
Republican electoral votes	170	170	156	156	156
Vote margin	8.6	9.3	10.0	10.8	11.5
<b>Scenario C "2004 Forward"</b>					
Democratic electoral votes	263	263	275	275	285
Republican electoral votes	275	275	263	263	253
Vote margin	0.1	1.0	1.8	2.6	3.4
<b>Scenario D "Maximum Minority Turnout"</b>					
Democratic electoral votes	332	347	345	373	373
Republican electoral votes	206	191	193	165	165
Vote margin	6.1	7.2	8.3	9.3	10.4
<b>Scenario E "High GOP Hispanic and Asian Support"</b>					
Democratic electoral votes	303	303	314	345	361
Republican electoral votes	235	235	224	193	177
Vote margin	2.5	3.1	3.8	4.5	5.2
<b>Scenario F "More GOP White Support"</b>					
Democratic electoral votes	213	213	242	261	287
Republican electoral votes	325	325	296	277	251
Vote margin	-2.4	-1.3	-0.1	1.1	2.3

Source: See Appendix B.

**TABLE A2**  
**Racial composition of eligible voters by state, 2016–2032**

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
AK	2016	65.9%	3.2%	5.3%	6.3%	19.3%
AK	2020	63.0%	3.2%	5.9%	7.2%	20.8%
AK	2024	59.9%	3.1%	6.5%	8.1%	22.4%
AK	2028	56.7%	3.1%	7.1%	9.0%	24.2%
AK	2032	53.4%	3.1%	7.7%	9.8%	26.0%
AL	2016	69.6%	25.9%	2.3%	0.7%	1.6%
AL	2020	68.6%	26.1%	2.8%	0.8%	1.8%
AL	2024	67.5%	26.4%	3.2%	0.9%	2.0%
AL	2028	66.5%	26.7%	3.7%	1.0%	2.2%
AL	2032	65.4%	27.0%	4.2%	1.0%	2.3%
AR	2016	76.9%	16.0%	4.0%	1.0%	2.1%
AR	2020	75.6%	16.2%	4.7%	1.1%	2.3%
AR	2024	74.3%	16.4%	5.4%	1.3%	2.6%
AR	2028	72.9%	16.7%	6.2%	1.4%	2.9%
AR	2032	71.4%	17.1%	6.9%	1.4%	3.1%
AZ	2016	63.9%	3.9%	24.4%	2.7%	5.0%
AZ	2020	61.1%	4.1%	26.4%	2.9%	5.6%
AZ	2024	58.4%	4.1%	28.2%	3.2%	6.1%
AZ	2028	55.7%	4.2%	30.1%	3.4%	6.6%
AZ	2032	53.1%	4.2%	32.0%	3.5%	7.1%
CA	2016	49.3%	6.6%	28.5%	13.4%	2.5%
CA	2020	46.3%	6.5%	30.7%	14.2%	2.7%
CA	2024	43.1%	6.4%	33.0%	14.8%	3.0%
CA	2028	40.2%	6.2%	35.1%	15.3%	3.2%
CA	2032	37.9%	6.1%	36.8%	15.8%	3.5%
CO	2016	74.6%	3.7%	17.1%	2.4%	2.3%
CO	2020	72.5%	3.6%	18.7%	2.6%	2.6%
CO	2024	70.2%	3.6%	20.5%	2.8%	2.9%
CO	2028	67.8%	3.6%	22.4%	3.0%	3.2%
CO	2032	65.4%	3.6%	24.3%	3.1%	3.6%
CT	2016	74.9%	9.0%	11.7%	3.2%	1.2%
CT	2020	72.5%	9.3%	13.1%	3.7%	1.4%

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
CT	2024	70.2%	9.5%	14.5%	4.2%	1.6%
CT	2028	67.8%	9.7%	16.1%	4.7%	1.8%
CT	2032	65.3%	9.8%	17.7%	5.1%	2.0%
DC	2016	35.9%	51.6%	7.1%	3.2%	2.2%
DC	2020	36.2%	49.4%	8.2%	3.6%	2.6%
DC	2024	35.9%	47.8%	9.3%	4.0%	3.0%
DC	2028	35.7%	46.1%	10.5%	4.3%	3.4%
DC	2032	34.9%	45.0%	11.8%	4.6%	3.8%
DE	2016	69.5%	20.9%	6.0%	2.2%	1.4%
DE	2020	67.7%	21.4%	6.9%	2.4%	1.6%
DE	2024	65.8%	21.9%	7.9%	2.6%	1.8%
DE	2028	63.8%	22.5%	8.9%	2.8%	2.0%
DE	2032	61.7%	23.1%	10.0%	3.0%	2.3%
FL	2016	64.5%	13.8%	18.2%	2.2%	1.4%
FL	2020	62.3%	14.1%	19.7%	2.4%	1.5%
FL	2024	60.0%	14.4%	21.3%	2.7%	1.7%
FL	2028	57.7%	14.7%	22.8%	2.9%	1.9%
FL	2032	55.6%	15.0%	24.3%	3.0%	2.1%
GA	2016	59.5%	31.5%	5.1%	2.8%	1.1%
GA	2020	57.7%	31.9%	5.9%	3.2%	1.3%
GA	2024	55.8%	32.5%	6.8%	3.6%	1.4%
GA	2028	53.8%	33.1%	7.7%	3.9%	1.6%
GA	2032	51.8%	33.7%	8.6%	4.2%	1.7%
HI	2016	24.2%	1.7%	7.9%	50.5%	15.2%
HI	2020	23.6%	1.7%	8.9%	48.0%	17.1%
HI	2024	23.0%	1.7%	9.7%	46.0%	18.6%
HI	2028	22.7%	1.7%	10.6%	44.8%	19.9%
HI	2032	22.3%	1.7%	11.3%	43.8%	20.8%
IA	2016	90.7%	2.9%	3.6%	1.4%	1.4%
IA	2020	89.5%	3.1%	4.3%	1.5%	1.6%
IA	2024	88.2%	3.4%	5.0%	1.7%	1.8%
IA	2028	86.9%	3.6%	5.7%	1.9%	2.0%
IA	2032	85.5%	3.8%	6.4%	2.0%	2.2%
ID	2016	87.5%	0.5%	7.7%	1.1%	3.2%
ID	2020	86.2%	0.5%	8.5%	1.2%	3.7%
ID	2024	84.8%	0.5%	9.3%	1.2%	4.1%

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
ID	2028	83.4%	0.5%	10.1%	1.3%	4.6%
ID	2032	82.0%	0.5%	11.0%	1.4%	5.1%
IL	2016	68.7%	15.0%	11.3%	4.1%	1.0%
IL	2020	66.6%	15.0%	12.7%	4.5%	1.2%
IL	2024	64.5%	15.1%	14.1%	5.0%	1.3%
IL	2028	62.3%	15.2%	15.6%	5.5%	1.5%
IL	2032	60.1%	15.3%	17.0%	5.9%	1.7%
IN	2016	84.0%	9.1%	4.5%	1.2%	1.2%
IN	2020	82.5%	9.5%	5.3%	1.4%	1.3%
IN	2024	81.0%	9.8%	6.0%	1.7%	1.5%
IN	2028	79.3%	10.3%	6.9%	1.9%	1.7%
IN	2032	77.6%	10.7%	7.8%	2.1%	1.8%
KS	2016	81.0%	5.8%	7.6%	2.2%	3.2%
KS	2020	79.0%	5.9%	8.9%	2.5%	3.7%
KS	2024	76.8%	6.0%	10.2%	2.8%	4.1%
KS	2028	74.6%	6.2%	11.6%	3.2%	4.5%
KS	2032	72.3%	6.3%	13.1%	3.5%	4.9%
KY	2016	88.5%	7.7%	1.7%	0.9%	1.2%
KY	2020	87.7%	8.0%	2.0%	1.0%	1.3%
KY	2024	86.8%	8.2%	2.3%	1.1%	1.5%
KY	2028	85.9%	8.6%	2.6%	1.3%	1.6%
KY	2032	84.9%	8.9%	3.0%	1.4%	1.8%
LA	2016	62.1%	31.7%	3.7%	1.1%	1.5%
LA	2020	60.7%	32.3%	4.2%	1.2%	1.7%
LA	2024	59.1%	32.8%	4.9%	1.3%	1.8%
LA	2028	57.6%	33.4%	5.5%	1.5%	2.0%
LA	2032	56.0%	34.0%	6.2%	1.6%	2.2%
MA	2016	80.9%	5.2%	7.8%	4.9%	1.2%
MA	2020	78.8%	5.4%	8.8%	5.6%	1.4%
MA	2024	76.7%	5.5%	9.9%	6.4%	1.6%
MA	2028	74.5%	5.7%	11.0%	7.1%	1.8%
MA	2032	72.4%	5.8%	12.1%	7.8%	2.0%
MD	2016	58.5%	29.5%	5.4%	5.0%	1.6%
MD	2020	56.1%	30.2%	6.2%	5.7%	1.8%
MD	2024	53.7%	30.9%	7.0%	6.4%	2.0%
MD	2028	51.3%	31.7%	7.8%	7.1%	2.2%



State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
MD	2032	49.0%	32.3%	8.7%	7.7%	2.3%
ME	2016	96.0%	0.7%	1.1%	0.6%	1.7%
ME	2020	95.5%	0.7%	1.2%	0.6%	1.9%
ME	2024	95.1%	0.7%	1.4%	0.7%	2.2%
ME	2028	94.7%	0.7%	1.5%	0.7%	2.4%
ME	2032	94.2%	0.7%	1.7%	0.7%	2.6%
MI	2016	78.4%	14.0%	3.6%	2.1%	1.9%
MI	2020	77.2%	14.3%	4.1%	2.3%	2.1%
MI	2024	75.9%	14.6%	4.6%	2.6%	2.4%
MI	2028	74.5%	14.9%	5.1%	2.9%	2.6%
MI	2032	73.2%	15.2%	5.6%	3.2%	2.9%
MN	2016	86.9%	4.4%	3.4%	3.1%	2.2%
MN	2020	85.2%	4.8%	4.0%	3.5%	2.5%
MN	2024	83.3%	5.3%	4.6%	4.0%	2.9%
MN	2028	81.4%	5.8%	5.3%	4.3%	3.2%
MN	2032	79.5%	6.2%	6.0%	4.7%	3.5%
MO	2016	82.7%	11.2%	2.8%	1.3%	2.0%
MO	2020	81.5%	11.5%	3.2%	1.4%	2.3%
MO	2024	80.2%	11.8%	3.7%	1.6%	2.7%
MO	2028	79.0%	12.1%	4.2%	1.8%	2.9%
MO	2032	77.7%	12.3%	4.7%	2.0%	3.2%
MS	2016	60.2%	35.8%	2.2%	0.7%	1.2%
MS	2020	59.1%	36.2%	2.6%	0.7%	1.4%
MS	2024	58.0%	36.6%	3.1%	0.8%	1.5%
MS	2028	56.9%	37.1%	3.6%	0.8%	1.6%
MS	2032	55.7%	37.6%	4.1%	0.9%	1.7%
MT	2016	88.4%	0.4%	2.4%	0.7%	8.1%
MT	2020	87.2%	0.4%	2.6%	0.8%	9.0%
MT	2024	85.8%	0.4%	2.9%	0.9%	10.0%
MT	2028	84.5%	0.4%	3.1%	1.1%	11.0%
MT	2032	83.0%	0.4%	3.4%	1.2%	12.1%
NC	2016	68.0%	23.0%	4.6%	1.7%	2.7%
NC	2020	66.3%	23.4%	5.4%	2.0%	2.9%
NC	2024	64.6%	23.8%	6.3%	2.2%	3.1%
NC	2028	62.8%	24.3%	7.2%	2.4%	3.2%
NC	2032	60.9%	24.9%	8.2%	2.6%	3.4%

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
ND	2016	89.3%	0.7%	2.0%	0.5%	7.5%
ND	2020	88.0%	0.7%	2.4%	0.5%	8.4%
ND	2024	86.7%	0.7%	2.7%	0.5%	9.3%
ND	2028	85.4%	0.8%	3.1%	0.6%	10.2%
ND	2032	84.1%	0.8%	3.4%	0.6%	11.1%
NE	2016	86.1%	4.0%	6.5%	1.5%	2.0%
NE	2020	84.5%	4.1%	7.5%	1.6%	2.2%
NE	2024	82.8%	4.3%	8.5%	1.8%	2.5%
NE	2028	81.2%	4.5%	9.6%	1.9%	2.8%
NE	2032	79.5%	4.7%	10.7%	2.1%	3.1%
NH	2016	94.3%	0.7%	1.9%	1.8%	1.3%
NH	2020	93.7%	0.7%	2.1%	2.1%	1.4%
NH	2024	93.1%	0.7%	2.3%	2.4%	1.5%
NH	2028	92.5%	0.7%	2.5%	2.7%	1.6%
NH	2032	91.9%	0.7%	2.7%	3.0%	1.7%
NJ	2016	64.7%	13.0%	14.1%	7.4%	0.9%
NJ	2020	62.1%	13.1%	15.5%	8.4%	1.0%
NJ	2024	59.4%	13.2%	17.0%	9.4%	1.2%
NJ	2028	56.7%	13.3%	18.5%	10.2%	1.3%
NJ	2032	54.2%	13.3%	20.0%	11.1%	1.4%
NM	2016	43.9%	1.9%	42.3%	1.4%	10.6%
NM	2020	41.6%	1.9%	44.1%	1.5%	11.0%
NM	2024	39.3%	1.8%	45.8%	1.6%	11.4%
NM	2028	37.1%	1.8%	47.6%	1.7%	11.9%
NM	2032	34.8%	1.7%	49.4%	1.8%	12.4%
NV	2016	61.7%	8.5%	19.0%	7.7%	3.4%
NV	2020	58.0%	8.8%	21.2%	8.3%	3.8%
NV	2024	54.6%	9.0%	23.5%	8.9%	4.2%
NV	2028	51.1%	9.2%	25.8%	9.3%	4.7%
NV	2032	47.9%	9.4%	28.0%	9.6%	5.1%
NY	2016	64.1%	13.5%	14.3%	6.8%	1.3%
NY	2020	62.0%	13.6%	15.5%	7.5%	1.5%
NY	2024	59.9%	13.6%	16.7%	8.3%	1.6%
NY	2028	57.8%	13.5%	17.9%	8.9%	1.8%
NY	2032	55.8%	13.5%	19.1%	9.6%	2.0%
OH	2016	83.0%	11.6%	2.7%	1.3%	1.4%

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
OH	2020	81.9%	11.9%	3.1%	1.5%	1.6%
OH	2024	80.8%	12.2%	3.5%	1.7%	1.9%
OH	2028	79.6%	12.5%	3.9%	1.9%	2.1%
OH	2032	78.4%	12.9%	4.4%	2.1%	2.3%
OK	2016	72.0%	7.3%	6.3%	1.3%	13.1%
OK	2020	69.8%	7.3%	7.3%	1.5%	14.2%
OK	2024	67.7%	7.2%	8.4%	1.6%	15.2%
OK	2028	65.6%	7.2%	9.5%	1.7%	16.1%
OK	2032	63.5%	7.2%	10.6%	1.7%	16.9%
OR	2016	83.2%	1.9%	7.6%	3.7%	3.7%
OR	2020	81.1%	1.9%	8.8%	4.1%	4.2%
OR	2024	79.0%	1.9%	10.1%	4.4%	4.6%
OR	2028	76.8%	2.0%	11.4%	4.8%	5.0%
OR	2032	74.6%	2.0%	12.8%	5.2%	5.4%
PA	2016	81.8%	10.0%	5.1%	2.1%	1.0%
PA	2020	80.2%	10.3%	5.9%	2.5%	1.1%
PA	2024	78.6%	10.6%	6.7%	2.9%	1.3%
PA	2028	77.0%	11.0%	7.5%	3.2%	1.4%
PA	2032	75.3%	11.3%	8.3%	3.6%	1.5%
RI	2016	82.0%	4.5%	8.9%	2.6%	2.0%
RI	2020	79.8%	4.7%	10.2%	3.0%	2.3%
RI	2024	77.7%	4.8%	11.6%	3.3%	2.7%
RI	2028	75.5%	4.9%	12.9%	3.7%	3.1%
RI	2032	73.4%	4.9%	14.2%	4.0%	3.5%
SC	2016	67.4%	27.1%	3.1%	1.1%	1.3%
SC	2020	66.4%	27.1%	3.7%	1.3%	1.5%
SC	2024	65.3%	27.3%	4.3%	1.4%	1.7%
SC	2028	64.1%	27.5%	4.9%	1.6%	1.9%
SC	2032	62.9%	27.7%	5.6%	1.8%	2.1%
SD	2016	87.0%	0.6%	2.1%	0.7%	9.7%
SD	2020	85.3%	0.6%	2.4%	0.8%	10.9%
SD	2024	83.5%	0.6%	2.7%	0.9%	12.3%
SD	2028	81.7%	0.6%	3.0%	1.0%	13.8%
SD	2032	79.8%	0.6%	3.2%	1.1%	15.3%
TN	2016	78.4%	16.3%	2.7%	1.1%	1.4%
TN	2020	77.3%	16.6%	3.2%	1.3%	1.6%

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
TN	2024	76.0%	17.0%	3.7%	1.5%	1.8%
TN	2028	74.8%	17.4%	4.2%	1.6%	2.0%
TN	2032	73.5%	17.8%	4.8%	1.8%	2.2%
TX	2016	51.4%	12.3%	31.6%	3.5%	1.3%
TX	2020	49.0%	12.3%	33.5%	3.9%	1.4%
TX	2024	46.6%	12.4%	35.4%	4.2%	1.6%
TX	2028	44.2%	12.4%	37.2%	4.5%	1.7%
TX	2032	42.0%	12.4%	39.1%	4.7%	1.8%
<b>US</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>68.6%</b>	<b>12.2%</b>	<b>12.6%</b>	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>2.2%</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>66.4%</b>	<b>12.2%</b>	<b>13.9%</b>	<b>5.1%</b>	<b>2.4%</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>64.2%</b>	<b>12.3%</b>	<b>15.3%</b>	<b>5.6%</b>	<b>2.6%</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>2028</b>	<b>61.9%</b>	<b>12.4%</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>6.1%</b>	<b>2.8%</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>2032</b>	<b>59.8%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>18.1%</b>	<b>6.6%</b>	<b>3.0%</b>
UT	2016	84.9%	0.9%	9.7%	2.5%	2.1%
UT	2020	83.0%	0.9%	11.0%	2.7%	2.4%
UT	2024	81.0%	0.9%	12.5%	2.9%	2.8%
UT	2028	78.9%	1.0%	14.0%	3.0%	3.1%
UT	2032	76.9%	1.0%	15.5%	3.1%	3.4%
VA	2016	68.2%	19.7%	5.4%	5.0%	1.8%
VA	2020	66.4%	19.7%	6.2%	5.6%	2.1%
VA	2024	64.5%	19.9%	7.1%	6.2%	2.4%
VA	2028	62.7%	20.0%	8.0%	6.7%	2.7%
VA	2032	60.7%	20.2%	8.9%	7.2%	2.9%
VT	2016	95.3%	0.7%	1.4%	0.8%	1.9%
VT	2020	94.6%	0.7%	1.6%	0.9%	2.1%
VT	2024	94.0%	0.8%	1.9%	1.0%	2.3%
VT	2028	93.3%	0.8%	2.1%	1.1%	2.6%
VT	2032	92.7%	0.8%	2.4%	1.3%	2.8%
WA	2016	77.7%	3.1%	7.7%	7.3%	4.4%
WA	2020	75.2%	3.2%	8.9%	8.0%	4.8%
WA	2024	72.8%	3.3%	10.1%	8.6%	5.3%
WA	2028	70.4%	3.4%	11.3%	9.3%	5.7%
WA	2032	68.1%	3.4%	12.5%	9.9%	6.1%
WI	2016	86.6%	5.6%	4.3%	1.6%	1.9%
WI	2020	85.3%	5.8%	4.9%	1.8%	2.1%

State	Year	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other
WI	2024	84.0%	6.1%	5.6%	2.0%	2.3%
WI	2028	82.6%	6.3%	6.3%	2.2%	2.5%
WI	2032	81.2%	6.6%	7.0%	2.5%	2.7%
WV	2016	93.3%	3.7%	1.1%	0.5%	1.5%
WV	2020	92.5%	3.9%	1.3%	0.6%	1.7%
WV	2024	91.7%	4.1%	1.5%	0.6%	2.1%
WV	2028	90.8%	4.4%	1.7%	0.7%	2.4%
WV	2032	89.8%	4.7%	2.0%	0.8%	2.8%
WY	2016	87.5%	0.8%	7.1%	0.5%	4.1%
WY	2020	86.2%	0.8%	7.8%	0.5%	4.7%
WY	2024	84.8%	0.8%	8.6%	0.5%	5.4%
WY	2028	83.3%	0.8%	9.4%	0.5%	6.0%
WY	2032	81.9%	0.8%	10.2%	0.5%	6.7%

Source: Estimates based on projections by Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>.

**TABLE A3**  
**Vote margins by state and scenario, 2016–2032**

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
AK	A	-12.6	-11.1	-9.6	-8.1	-6.6
AL	A	-21.5	-20.7	-19.8	-19.0	-18.1
AR	A	-23.0	-22.2	-21.3	-20.4	-19.4
AZ	A	-7.9	-6.7	-5.5	-4.3	-3.0
CA	A	24.4	25.5	26.6	27.7	28.7
CO	A	6.1	7.0	7.8	8.8	9.8
CT	A	18.4	19.5	20.6	21.9	23.1
DC	A	83.1	82.8	82.5	82.2	82.1
DE	A	19.6	20.6	21.7	22.8	23.9
FL	A	1.7	2.5	3.4	4.2	5.0
GA	A	-5.9	-3.8	-1.8	0.3	2.4
HI	A	42.4	42.2	42.1	41.9	41.8
IA	A	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.3	6.6
ID	A	-31.6	-31.2	-30.8	-30.4	-29.9
IL	A	17.8	18.9	19.9	21.0	22.2
IN	A	-9.5	-8.6	-7.7	-6.8	-5.8
KS	A	-21.0	-20.1	-19.2	-18.2	-17.1
KY	A	-22.4	-22.0	-21.7	-21.3	-20.8
LA	A	-15.5	-13.7	-11.9	-10.0	-8.2
MA	A	23.5	23.8	24.2	24.5	24.9
MD	A	27.6	29.1	30.6	32.1	33.4
ME	A	14.9	14.6	14.3	14.0	13.7
MI	A	9.7	9.9	10.2	10.6	11.0
MN	A	8.0	8.5	9.0	9.5	10.0
MO	A	-8.9	-8.4	-7.8	-7.2	-6.6
MS	A	-10.6	-9.8	-8.9	-8.1	-7.2
MT	A	-13.6	-13.4	-13.1	-12.8	-12.4
NC	A	-0.6	1.1	2.7	4.5	6.2
ND	A	-19.1	-18.6	-18.2	-17.6	-17.1
NE	A	-21.4	-21.0	-20.5	-20.0	-19.5
NH	A	5.3	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.0
NJ	A	19.0	20.1	21.3	22.4	23.5

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
NM	A	11.2	12.4	13.5	14.7	15.9
NV	A	8.9	10.9	12.8	14.7	16.3
NY	A	29.2	30.1	31.0	32.0	32.9
OH	A	3.3	3.7	4.2	4.6	5.2
OK	A	-33.3	-33.0	-32.6	-32.2	-31.8
OR	A	12.3	12.6	13.0	13.3	13.8
PA	A	6.2	7.0	7.9	8.9	9.8
RI	A	28.1	28.7	29.4	30.0	30.6
SC	A	-9.9	-9.4	-8.7	-8.1	-7.5
SD	A	-18.0	-18.0	-18.0	-18.1	-18.1
TN	A	-19.7	-18.9	-18.1	-17.2	-16.3
TX	A	-14.5	-13.1	-11.8	-10.5	-9.2
UT	A	-47.1	-46.1	-45.1	-44.2	-43.2
VA	A	4.9	6.1	7.2	8.4	9.5
VT	A	35.6	35.7	35.8	35.9	36.0
WA	A	15.3	15.7	16.2	16.7	17.1
WI	A	7.2	7.6	8.0	8.3	8.7
WV	A	-26.9	-26.9	-26.8	-26.8	-26.6
WY	A	-40.3	-39.8	-39.3	-38.7	-38.2
AK	B	-19.6	-18.4	-17.3	-16.1	-15.0
AL	B	-20.4	-19.5	-18.7	-17.8	-16.9
AR	B	-18.8	-18.1	-17.3	-16.4	-15.5
AZ	B	-7.8	-7.4	-7.0	-6.5	-6.0
CA	B	25.1	25.5	25.9	26.2	26.5
CO	B	9.4	9.8	10.3	10.9	11.5
CT	B	23.6	24.4	25.3	26.2	27.2
DC	B	84.7	84.5	84.2	84.0	84.0
DE	B	26.2	27.1	27.9	28.9	29.8
FL	B	4.4	5.2	6.0	6.8	7.6
GA	B	-2.8	-1.3	0.2	1.7	3.3
HI	B	45.4	45.5	45.7	45.8	46.1
IA	B	10.1	10.5	10.9	11.3	11.8
ID	B	-25.1	-24.8	-24.5	-24.2	-23.9
IL	B	26.5	27.3	28.1	28.9	29.8
IN	B	1.9	2.6	3.3	4.1	4.9
KS	B	-13.3	-12.3	-11.3	-10.3	-9.2

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
KY	B	-15.6	-15.2	-14.8	-14.3	-13.9
LA	B	-16.5	-15.3	-14.1	-12.8	-11.5
MA	B	26.4	26.8	27.2	27.6	28.1
MD	B	28.6	30.1	31.5	33.0	34.4
ME	B	16.4	16.1	15.9	15.6	15.5
MI	B	17.0	17.4	17.8	18.3	18.9
MN	B	11.5	12.2	13.0	13.8	14.6
MO	B	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.8
MS	B	-11.2	-10.2	-9.1	-8.1	-7.1
MT	B	-2.2	-1.9	-1.6	-1.3	-0.8
NC	B	2.1	3.3	4.5	5.9	7.2
ND	B	-8.1	-7.8	-7.5	-7.2	-6.8
NE	B	-14.5	-14.2	-13.8	-13.5	-13.0
NH	B	9.2	9.1	9.0	9.0	8.9
NJ	B	17.5	18.5	19.5	20.6	21.6
NM	B	16.3	17.1	17.9	18.7	19.6
NV	B	16.2	17.8	19.5	21.2	22.6
NY	B	28.3	29.0	29.8	30.5	31.2
OH	B	5.0	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.3
OK	B	-29.9	-29.0	-28.1	-27.2	-26.2
OR	B	16.7	17.0	17.2	17.5	17.8
PA	B	11.5	12.2	12.9	13.6	14.3
RI	B	28.9	29.5	30.1	30.8	31.4
SC	B	-8.2	-7.5	-6.9	-6.3	-5.6
SD	B	-8.1	-7.9	-7.6	-7.3	-7.1
TN	B	-14.5	-13.9	-13.4	-12.8	-12.1
TX	B	-9.3	-8.1	-6.9	-5.7	-4.5
UT	B	-27.6	-27.4	-27.1	-26.8	-26.5
VA	B	8.0	9.0	10.1	11.2	12.3
VT	B	36.5	36.4	36.2	36.1	36.1
WA	B	17.7	18.1	18.5	18.8	19.2
WI	B	14.4	14.6	14.9	15.2	15.5
WV	B	-12.8	-12.5	-12.1	-11.7	-11.3
WY	B	-31.0	-30.3	-29.5	-28.8	-28.0
AK	C	-23.8	-23.3	-22.8	-22.3	-21.8
AL	C	-23.5	-22.7	-21.8	-20.9	-20.0



State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
AR	C	-7.8	-6.9	-6.1	-5.1	-4.2
AZ	C	-8.0	-7.3	-6.5	-5.8	-5.1
CA	C	13.7	14.6	15.5	16.4	17.2
CO	C	-2.9	-2.1	-1.3	-0.4	0.5
CT	C	12.8	13.7	14.6	15.6	16.6
DC	C	77.1	76.7	76.3	76.0	75.8
DE	C	10.2	11.3	12.3	13.4	14.5
FL	C	-3.4	-2.9	-2.5	-2.1	-1.7
GA	C	-13.2	-11.7	-10.2	-8.6	-7.0
HI	C	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.8
IA	C	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.5
ID	C	-36.8	-36.4	-36.1	-35.7	-35.3
IL	C	13.1	14.1	15.1	16.1	17.0
IN	C	-17.9	-16.9	-15.9	-14.8	-13.8
KS	C	-23.6	-22.9	-22.2	-21.5	-20.9
KY	C	-18.3	-17.7	-17.1	-16.4	-15.8
LA	C	-10.7	-9.3	-8.0	-6.6	-5.3
MA	C	26.7	27.2	27.7	28.2	28.7
MD	C	16.8	17.9	19.1	20.2	21.3
ME	C	9.8	9.9	10.0	10.0	10.0
MI	C	5.3	5.9	6.5	7.0	7.6
MN	C	5.5	6.2	6.9	7.6	8.3
MO	C	-5.1	-4.3	-3.6	-2.9	-2.3
MS	C	-16.9	-15.9	-14.8	-13.8	-12.8
MT	C	-19.0	-18.6	-18.2	-17.7	-17.4
NC	C	-9.3	-7.9	-6.4	-4.9	-3.4
ND	C	-26.1	-25.8	-25.5	-25.2	-25.0
NE	C	-31.9	-31.6	-31.2	-30.8	-30.5
NH	C	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0
NJ	C	8.9	9.6	10.2	10.9	11.5
NM	C	2.2	3.0	3.9	4.7	5.5
NV	C	1.3	2.4	3.5	4.6	5.6
NY	C	20.8	21.5	22.3	23.0	23.7
OH	C	-0.5	0.0	0.5	1.1	1.7
OK	C	-29.7	-29.2	-28.7	-28.3	-27.8
OR	C	6.0	6.6	7.3	7.9	8.6

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
PA	C	4.5	5.3	6.0	6.8	7.5
RI	C	22.3	22.9	23.5	24.0	24.5
SC	C	-15.6	-14.7	-13.9	-13.1	-12.4
SD	C	-19.8	-19.4	-18.9	-18.5	-18.1
TN	C	-11.8	-10.8	-9.9	-9.0	-8.1
TX	C	-18.1	-16.7	-15.3	-13.9	-12.6
UT	C	-43.3	-42.5	-41.7	-41.0	-40.2
VA	C	-5.3	-4.2	-3.1	-2.0	-0.9
VT	C	20.3	20.3	20.3	20.2	20.2
WA	C	7.4	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.5
WI	C	2.3	2.9	3.4	3.9	4.3
WV	C	-11.8	-11.2	-10.7	-10.2	-9.7
WY	C	-38.8	-38.5	-38.2	-37.9	-37.6
AK	D	-9.8	-8.2	-6.6	-4.9	-3.4
AL	D	-20.8	-19.9	-18.9	-18.0	-17.0
AR	D	-21.8	-20.8	-19.7	-18.6	-17.4
AZ	D	-4.1	-2.7	-1.3	0.1	1.6
CA	D	27.1	28.2	29.3	30.4	31.4
CO	D	8.6	9.7	10.7	11.9	13.0
CT	D	20.3	21.7	23.0	24.4	25.8
DC	D	82.9	82.5	82.2	82.0	81.8
DE	D	20.1	21.3	22.3	23.5	24.7
FL	D	1.7	2.5	3.4	4.2	5.1
GA	D	-5.2	-3.1	-1.0	1.2	3.3
HI	D	44.1	43.9	43.7	43.5	43.5
IA	D	6.7	7.0	7.3	7.7	8.1
ID	D	-30.2	-29.7	-29.2	-28.6	-28.0
IL	D	19.3	20.5	21.7	23.0	24.2
IN	D	-9.0	-8.1	-7.1	-6.1	-5.1
KS	D	-18.2	-16.8	-15.5	-14.1	-12.7
KY	D	-22.1	-21.7	-21.3	-20.8	-20.4
LA	D	-15.4	-13.6	-11.8	-9.9	-8.1
MA	D	24.3	24.8	25.3	25.7	26.2
MD	D	28.0	29.5	31.0	32.5	33.9
ME	D	14.9	14.6	14.3	14.0	13.8
MI	D	9.7	10.0	10.3	10.7	11.1

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
MN	D	8.6	9.1	9.7	10.3	11.0
MO	D	-8.7	-8.2	-7.6	-7.0	-6.4
MS	D	-10.7	-9.9	-9.0	-8.2	-7.4
MT	D	-13.0	-12.7	-12.3	-11.9	-11.4
NC	D	-0.3	1.4	3.1	4.9	6.6
ND	D	-18.3	-17.7	-17.1	-16.5	-15.9
NE	D	-20.1	-19.5	-18.9	-18.2	-17.5
NH	D	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.4
NJ	D	19.7	20.8	22.0	23.2	24.3
NM	D	13.8	14.9	16.0	17.2	18.3
NV	D	9.1	11.1	13.0	14.8	16.4
NY	D	29.9	30.9	31.9	32.9	33.9
OH	D	3.3	3.7	4.1	4.6	5.1
OK	D	-32.5	-32.1	-31.7	-31.2	-30.7
OR	D	13.5	13.9	14.4	14.9	15.4
PA	D	7.2	8.2	9.3	10.3	11.4
RI	D	28.5	29.1	29.8	30.4	31.0
SC	D	-9.6	-9.0	-8.3	-7.7	-7.1
SD	D	-17.5	-17.4	-17.4	-17.3	-17.3
TN	D	-20.0	-19.2	-18.4	-17.6	-16.7
TX	D	-11.4	-10.1	-8.7	-7.4	-6.2
UT	D	-43.2	-41.7	-40.3	-38.8	-37.4
VA	D	5.2	6.3	7.5	8.6	9.8
VT	D	35.7	35.8	35.9	36.0	36.1
WA	D	15.4	15.8	16.2	16.6	17.0
WI	D	8.1	8.6	9.1	9.6	10.1
WV	D	-26.8	-26.8	-26.8	-26.7	-26.5
WY	D	-39.1	-38.4	-37.8	-37.1	-36.4
AK	E	-16.4	-15.4	-14.3	-13.2	-12.2
AL	E	-21.9	-21.2	-20.5	-19.7	-18.9
AR	E	-23.7	-23.0	-22.2	-21.4	-20.5
AZ	E	-11.6	-10.8	-9.9	-9.0	-8.0
CA	E	18.5	19.2	19.8	20.5	21.1
CO	E	3.6	4.2	4.8	5.4	6.1
CT	E	16.6	17.5	18.4	19.3	20.3
DC	E	81.6	81.0	80.4	80.0	79.6

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
DE	E	18.5	19.4	20.3	21.3	22.2
FL	E	-1.5	-1.0	-0.4	0.1	0.7
GA	E	-7.0	-5.1	-3.2	-1.3	0.7
HI	E	32.4	32.1	31.9	31.6	31.4
IA	E	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4
ID	E	-32.8	-32.6	-32.4	-32.1	-31.8
IL	E	16.0	16.8	17.6	18.4	19.3
IN	E	-10.2	-9.5	-8.8	-8.0	-7.2
KS	E	-22.1	-21.4	-20.8	-20.0	-19.2
KY	E	-22.9	-22.6	-22.3	-21.9	-21.6
LA	E	-16.3	-14.6	-13.0	-11.2	-9.5
MA	E	21.8	21.9	22.0	22.1	22.2
MD	E	26.1	27.4	28.6	29.9	31.0
ME	E	14.5	14.1	13.8	13.4	13.1
MI	E	8.7	8.8	9.0	9.2	9.5
MN	E	7.0	7.3	7.6	8.0	8.4
MO	E	-9.6	-9.2	-8.8	-8.3	-7.8
MS	E	-11.0	-10.2	-9.4	-8.6	-7.8
MT	E	-14.9	-14.9	-14.7	-14.6	-14.4
NC	E	-1.7	-0.2	1.3	2.9	4.4
ND	E	-20.3	-19.9	-19.6	-19.2	-18.9
NE	E	-22.4	-22.1	-21.8	-21.5	-21.1
NH	E	4.7	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.1
NJ	E	16.1	16.9	17.7	18.6	19.3
NM	E	4.2	5.0	5.8	6.6	7.4
NV	E	4.8	6.3	7.8	9.3	10.5
NY	E	26.3	27.0	27.6	28.3	28.9
OH	E	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.5	4.0
OK	E	-35.7	-35.6	-35.5	-35.3	-35.2
OR	E	10.6	10.7	10.8	10.9	11.0
PA	E	5.3	6.0	6.7	7.5	8.3
RI	E	26.4	26.8	27.1	27.5	27.8
SC	E	-10.5	-10.1	-9.6	-9.1	-8.6
SD	E	-19.4	-19.6	-19.8	-20.1	-20.3
TN	E	-20.5	-19.8	-19.1	-18.4	-17.6
TX	E	-18.5	-17.5	-16.5	-15.5	-14.5

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
UT	E	-48.4	-47.6	-46.8	-46.0	-45.2
VA	E	3.3	4.2	5.1	6.0	6.9
VT	E	35.1	35.2	35.2	35.2	35.2
WA	E	12.8	13.0	13.1	13.3	13.4
WI	E	6.4	6.7	6.9	7.2	7.5
WV	E	-27.3	-27.3	-27.3	-27.4	-27.3
WY	E	-41.5	-41.1	-40.8	-40.4	-40.0
AK	F	-19.7	-18.0	-16.2	-14.4	-12.6
AL	F	-28.5	-27.6	-26.7	-25.7	-24.8
AR	F	-31.1	-30.1	-29.1	-28.1	-26.9
AZ	F	-15.0	-13.6	-12.2	-10.7	-9.2
CA	F	19.0	20.4	21.8	23.1	24.3
CO	F	-1.9	-0.9	0.2	1.4	2.6
CT	F	10.4	11.8	13.1	14.6	16.0
DC	F	79.2	78.9	78.7	78.5	78.5
DE	F	12.3	13.5	14.7	16.0	17.3
FL	F	-4.9	-3.8	-2.7	-1.7	-0.7
GA	F	-11.9	-9.7	-7.4	-5.1	-2.9
HI	F	39.3	39.2	39.1	38.9	39.0
IA	F	-3.5	-3.2	-3.0	-2.7	-2.3
ID	F	-40.7	-40.2	-39.7	-39.2	-38.6
IL	F	10.8	12.0	13.3	14.6	15.9
IN	F	-17.9	-16.9	-15.9	-14.8	-13.7
KS	F	-29.6	-28.6	-27.5	-26.4	-25.2
KY	F	-31.3	-30.9	-30.4	-29.9	-29.4
LA	F	-21.6	-19.6	-17.7	-15.7	-13.7
MA	F	15.1	15.6	16.2	16.7	17.3
MD	F	21.8	23.5	25.2	26.9	28.5
ME	F	5.2	4.9	4.7	4.4	4.2
MI	F	1.6	2.0	2.5	2.9	3.5
MN	F	-0.9	-0.3	0.3	1.0	1.7
MO	F	-17.2	-16.6	-15.9	-15.2	-14.5
MS	F	-16.5	-15.5	-14.5	-13.6	-12.7
MT	F	-22.7	-22.4	-22.0	-21.6	-21.0
NC	F	-7.2	-5.4	-3.5	-1.6	0.3
ND	F	-28.3	-27.7	-27.1	-26.5	-25.9

State	Scenario	2016	2020	2024	2028	2032
NE	F	-30.4	-29.8	-29.2	-28.6	-27.9
NH	F	-4.3	-4.3	-4.4	-4.5	-4.4
NJ	F	12.3	13.7	15.1	16.5	17.8
NM	F	6.1	7.5	8.9	10.3	11.8
NV	F	2.5	4.8	7.1	9.3	11.2
NY	F	22.7	23.8	24.9	26.1	27.2
OH	F	-4.8	-4.3	-3.7	-3.2	-2.5
OK	F	-41.0	-40.5	-40.0	-39.4	-38.8
OR	F	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.2	5.8
PA	F	-2.2	-1.1	-0.1	0.9	2.1
RI	F	19.8	20.6	21.4	22.2	23.0
SC	F	-16.6	-15.9	-15.2	-14.5	-13.8
SD	F	-27.0	-26.9	-26.8	-26.6	-26.5
TN	F	-27.4	-26.5	-25.5	-24.6	-23.5
TX	F	-20.3	-18.8	-17.2	-15.7	-14.1
UT	F	-56.2	-55.1	-54.0	-52.8	-51.7
VA	F	-2.0	-0.7	0.7	2.0	3.3
VT	F	26.1	26.2	26.3	26.5	26.6
WA	F	7.2	7.9	8.5	9.2	9.8
WI	F	-1.6	-1.2	-0.7	-0.2	0.3
WV	F	-36.2	-36.2	-36.0	-35.9	-35.6
WY	F	-49.4	-48.8	-48.2	-47.5	-46.9

Source: See Appendix B.

## Appendix B

### Figure 3, Presidential vote margins by race, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, "Dataverse," available at <http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/data> (last accessed January 2016); Roper Center at Cornell University, "National Election Day Exit Polls," available at <http://roper-center.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federaelections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federaelections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federaelections2004.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2000: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2001), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/tcontents.htm>.

### Figure 6, Presidential vote margins by age, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015),

available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “Dataverse,” available at <http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/data> (last accessed January 2016); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2000: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2001), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/tcontents.htm>.

### Figure 9, National support levels by simulation, 2016

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,” and “CCES Common Content, 2008,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate,



and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>.

### Figure 10, National support rates by simulation, 2016–2032

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,” and “CCES Common Content, 2008,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>; Electoral college projections from Election Data Services, “2015 Reapportionment Analysis,” Press release, December 22, 2015, available at [https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR\\_Appor15wTables.pdf](https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR_Appor15wTables.pdf).

### Figure 11, Actual election results, 2000–2012

Source: U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>; U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2000: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2001), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/tcontents.htm>.

### Figure 14, White vote margin, 2012

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey 2012: November Supplement (2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); The Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls” (2012), available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; state-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>.

### Figure 17, Electoral college results by simulation, 2016

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,”

and “CCES Common Content, 2008,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>.

#### Figure 18, Election results by simulation, 2016

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,” and “CCES Common Content, 2008,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the

U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>.

### Figure 19, Election results by simulation, 2020 and 2032

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,” and “CCES Common Content, 2008,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>; Electoral college projections from Election Data Services, “2015 Reapportionment Analysis,” Press release, December 22, 2015, available at [https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR\\_Appor15wTables.pdf](https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR_Appor15wTables.pdf).

### Figure 20, Electoral college results by simulation, 2016–2032

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, "CCES Common Content, 2012," and "CCES Common Content, 2008," available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, "National Election Day Exit Polls," available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, "Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>; Electoral college projections from Election Data Services, "2015 Reapportionment Analysis," Press release, December 22, 2015, available at [https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR\\_Appor15wTables.pdf](https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR_Appor15wTables.pdf).

### Table A1, Voting margins and electoral votes for presidential elections by simulation, 2016–2032

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, "CCES Common Content, 2012," and "CCES Common Content, 2008," available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, "National Election Day Exit Polls," available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections

from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>; Electoral college projections from Election Data Services, “2015 Reapportionment Analysis,” Press release, December 22, 2015, available at [https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR\\_Appor15wTables.pdf](https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NR_Appor15wTables.pdf).

#### Table A3, Vote margins by state and scenario, 2016–2032

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004, 2008, and 2012), available at <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>; Cooperative Congressional Election Study, “CCES Common Content, 2012,” and “CCES Common Content, 2008,” available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21447> (last accessed November 2015); Roper Center at Cornell University, “National Election Day Exit Polls,” available at <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/>; Projections from Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution for the American Electorate 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2013), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalections2012.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the

U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2009), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalections2008.shtml>; State-level election results from U.S. Federal Elections Commission, “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives” (2005), available at <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalections2004.shtml>.

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The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Center for American Progress, the American Enterprise Institute, or the Brookings Institution.

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## Endnotes

- 1 William H. Frey, *Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics are Remaking America* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), chapter 11.
- 2 Ronald Brownstein, "The Gray and the Brown: The Generational Mismatch," *National Journal*, July 24, 2010 pp. 14–22.
- 3 Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin, "The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate," The Center for American Progress, February 24, 2015, available at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/news/2015/02/24/107166/interactive-the-demographic-evolution-of-the-american-electorate-1980-2060/>.
- 4 For Hispanics and Asians, the turnout rates of each race/age group is matched to the complementary turnout of whites in the same age range. For example, this would make Hispanics' age 18–29 turnout the same level as whites' age 18–29 turnout. This equalization of race groups within age categories is necessary because other racial groups are younger than whites, and turnout rates tend to be higher for older age groups.
- 5 Frey, *Diversity Explosion*, Table 11.1.
- 6 David Bositis, "Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention" (Washington: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2004), Table 1; Pew Research Center, "Latino Voters and the 2012 Election" (2012), Figure 1, available at [http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/11/2012\\_Latino\\_vote\\_exit\\_poll\\_analysis\\_final\\_11-07-12.pdf](http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/11/2012_Latino_vote_exit_poll_analysis_final_11-07-12.pdf); Frey, *Diversity Explosion*, pp. 218–220.
- 7 Thomas File, "The Diversifying Electorate-Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2010 (and Other Recent Elections)" (Suitland, MD: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2013), pp. 20–569, available at <https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf>. Though black turnout may also have been higher than white turnout in 2008. See Michael P. McDonald, "2012 Turnout: Race, Ethnicity and the Youth Vote," *The Huffington Post*, July 8, 2013, available at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/2012-turnout-race-ethnic\\_b\\_3240179.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/2012-turnout-race-ethnic_b_3240179.html).
- 8 These statistics are taken from the Bureau of the Census' Current Population Survey Voting Supplement, administered to respondents during November of presidential and congressional election years. They may differ from statistics taken from exit polls administered by media conglomerates on the day of the election.
- 9 The support rates—the percent voting for the Democratic candidate or the percent voting for the Republican candidate—and voting margins—the percent voting for the Democratic candidate minus the percent voting for the Republican candidate—for minorities and whites we use in this report and in our simulations are based on our analysis of data from the the Bureau of the Census' Current Population Survey, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, the National Election Pool exit polls, and state election returns. They tend to differ somewhat from publicly reported figures based on the exit polls. That is because our approach supplements exit poll data with data from other sources and corrects for significant discrepancies between exit poll and census data. Our figures may be thought of as harmonized estimates across these various data sources. For more detail, see the methodological appendix to this report.
- 10 Authors' analysis of CBS/New York Times, Voter Research and Surveys, Voter News Service, and National Election Poll national exit polls.
- 11 Pew Research Center, "The Generation Gap and the 2012 Election" (2011), available at <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/11-3-11%20Generations%20Release.pdf>.
- 12 Brownstein, "The Gray and the Brown"; Pew Research Center "The Generation Gap and the 2012 Election."
- 13 To quantify this distinction, we conducted a hypothetical simulation of the 2008 and 2012 elections which assumed the actual age and race profiles of every state's eligible voters in those years but attributed to each age/race group in every state their 2004 turnout rates and Democratic and Republican voting patterns—for example, whites, 18–29, blacks, 18–29, Hispanics 18–29, Asians, 18–29, other race, 18–29, whites, 30–44, etc. In 2004, overall white turnout rates were higher and minority turnout rates were lower than in the subsequent elections; in addition, minority D-R voting margins for all three minority groups and younger adults were lower in 2004. Under this hypothetical scenario, the Republican candidate would have won the national popular vote in both 2008 and 2012. That is, the D-R voting margin would have been minus 1.6 percent in 2008, and in the 2012 election, a tiny minus 0.7 percent compared with actual D-R margins of plus 7.3 percent and plus 3.9 percent, respectively, as shown in Table 1. In both years, the margins are less than in 2004, when it was minus 2.5 percent. These lower hypothetical Republican margins reflect the less Republican-favorable demography that evolved in the electorate over the period to 2012. But as counterfactuals, they also show the effect that higher relative minority turnout and Democratic candidate support had in electing Barack Obama in both of those years. For a description of the methodology used in these and our other simulations, see the methodological appendix to this report.
- 14 For Hispanics and Asians, the turnout rates of each race/age group is matched to the complementary turnout of whites in the same age range. For example, this would make Hispanics' age 18 to 29 turnout at the same level as whites age 18 to 29 turnout. This equalization of race groups within age categories is necessary because other racial groups are younger than whites, and turnout rates tend to be higher for older ages.
- 15 Note that this figure is slightly different from the 20 point GOP margin for whites reported by the 2012 exit polls. As previously noted, this is because our approach supplements exit poll data with data from other sources and corrects for significant discrepancies between exit poll and census data, producing harmonized estimates of support by race. Note also that our harmonized estimates—because they actually reduce the gap in support rates between whites and minorities—tend to give more conservative estimates of the electoral effect of demographic change. For more detail, see the methodological appendix to this report.
- 16 1984 CBS/New York Times national exit poll.
- 17 Frey, *Diversity Explosion*; Teixeira, Frey and Griffin, "The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate."
- 18 Pew Research Center, "The Generation Gap and the 2012 Election."
- 19 However, under the hybrid scenario of plus 3 points of white GOP support and plus 5 points of new minority GOP support, the 2016 Republican Electoral College advantage under this scenario switches to the Democrats in 2020 and beyond.
- 20 Andrei Rogers, *Introduction to Multiregional Mathematical Demography* (New York: Wiley, 1975).

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