



Recalibrating U.S. Global Relationships

America's international reputation has suffered greatly from the current administration's abandonment of alliances, disregard of democratic values, and mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The next administration will need to make a concerted effort to rebuild relationships with democratic allies and partners, offering a new vision for global engagement with democratic values at its core. The following chapter provides recommendations to restore democratic partnerships, compete more effectively with adversaries, and recalibrate relationships to fit today's challenges.



America's global position is no longer unrivaled. Democracy is under siege, international institutions are under strain, rapid technological transformation has unintentionally benefited autocrats, and America's image has been greatly tarnished. Over the past four years, the world has not stood still and waited for America to sort out its own dysfunction. The next administration will represent an America whose reputation and alliances have been badly battered.

Since 2017, the United States has regularly been absent on the world stage, skipping important international meetings and ignoring key global efforts. When the Trump administration has been engaged, it has mostly sought to obstruct progress. Instead of leading, America has become a country that others have to manage or work around, while authoritarian and illiberal regimes leverage America's absence to their benefit.¹ As a result, the international community has grown increasingly accustomed to a world without U.S. leadership.

America's abdication of global leadership has led to little progress in addressing major global challenges, most notably the COVID-19 pandemic. As the pandemic worsened, no cohesive global policy was put forth—in part because of a lack of U.S. leadership and an incompetent response by the Trump administration. While the United States has struggled with its own mistakes, much of the world—in particular long-standing U.S. allies—has struggled without America's ability to build coalitions to galvanize action and organize global responses.²

America's competitors and adversaries will not be eager to see the United States try to lead again. China and Russia have sought to expand their influence and fill some of the gaps that America's retreat has left. These rivals seek a less-liberal world in which they lead—not one in which America, in partnership with democratic allies, drives global action.³ The United States should demonstrate that a liberal democratic system is the best form of government. While the emergence of this renewed competition has brought comparisons to the Cold War, proving the efficacy of liberal democracies requires neither a dangerous arms race nor constant military interventions.

Ultimately, the next administration cannot pretend the past four years never happened. The world has dramatically changed, and a broad recalibration of U.S. foreign policy must take place. There is no way to return to the status quo of a few years ago, nor should the next administration embrace such an effort. The United States needs to look at its global relationships—with democratic allies, adversaries, or even more-challenging partners—in an entirely new way.

This recalibration must entail rebuilding relations with democratic allies and partners, recommitting to America’s liberal democratic principles, and offering a positive global vision that seeks bold action to address the world’s most pressing challenges. First and foremost, this recalibration will also require emphasizing U.S. global relationships that align more directly with our democratic values. It will require action to position the United States to compete internationally and deliver results for the American people. And finally, it will require bold shifts on legacy relationships that no longer serve U.S. interests.

In addition to the long-term repairs the next administration will need to undertake, prioritizing action in the first 100 days is critical. Where the next administration spends its time and focus—whether on presidential trips, meetings, or initiatives, virtual or otherwise—will signal its priorities to the world. The recommendations that follow do not cover every corner of the globe, and certainly not every important relationship. Rather, they are an attempt to strategically recalibrate U.S. efforts overall. To support long-term U.S. national security interests and better align U.S. foreign policy in support of democratic values, in its first 100 days, the next administration should:

1. Prioritize democratic allies and partners.
2. Compete more effectively with China.
3. Stand up to Russia.
4. Recalibrate relations with backsliding allies, toxic partners, and long-standing adversaries.

The recommendations that follow offer a wide array of options and approaches for advancing these goals.

Prioritize democratic allies and partners

The next administration must first embrace a bold approach and vision that puts democratic values at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.⁴ To do this, the United States should seek to rebuild and revive existing relationships with its traditional democratic allies as well as build stronger ties with other democracies around the world.

America must reengage its allies and partners with humility while leading by example. The next administration will have to earn the trust of the world, which will require acknowledging the United States' democratic shortcomings and human rights failures at home. Instead of dictating to allies or immediately making new demands, the next administration will need to listen and strive to build more durable partnerships, including restoring trust with the United States' closest friends. The administration will also need to humbly reengage with multilateral institutions.



OVERARCHING POLICY:

Reimagine the trans-Atlantic relationship

The trans-Atlantic relationship is in crisis, and it is largely America's own doing. The Trump administration has essentially abandoned Europe, taking an overtly hostile approach to NATO and the European Union.⁵ This abandonment has left some of America's key allies shaken, looking for ways to move forward without the United States. A fundamentally new approach is needed to revive the trans-Atlantic relationship. The United States will need to do more than just recommit to the NATO alliance. It should seek to build a new strategic partnership with the EU.⁶ As a part of this reimagining of the trans-Atlantic relationship, the next administration should take the following steps in the first 100 days:

- **Plan for the president's first overseas trip to be to Europe, when safe to do so, with a first stop in Brussels to visit the EU and NATO headquarters.** This trip would signal the importance of democratic allies and values. The president should give a speech before the European Parliament to lay out a bold new vision for trans-Atlantic

relations, expressing a desire to launch a new U.S.-EU partnership. The speech should announce U.S. support for European integration and call for the United States and Europe to forge common approaches to key global issues such as climate, pandemic response, China, and the shared threats of rising authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. A president's declaration to collaborate with Europe to lead on climate action, in particular, would reinforce the administration's message of returning to global leadership and repairing trans-Atlantic relations.

- **Develop a new trans-Atlantic agenda.** The president should announce the establishment of new joint U.S.-EU working groups on climate, post-COVID-19 economic recovery, China, election interference, technology, and digital trade, with the goal of issuing a new trans-Atlantic agenda at the next U.S.-EU Summit.
- **Send a high-profile delegation, led by the U.S. vice president, to the Munich Security Conference to announce a new set of U.S.-NATO initiatives.** The annual Munich Security Conference in February will be an early chance for the next administration to signal its commitment to the NATO alliance as well as launch a series of new U.S. initiatives to strengthen and modernize the alliance. This could include launching a NATO investment initiative—a mixture of grants and loans that would incentivize former Warsaw Pact NATO members to retire their aging and decrepit Soviet/Russian equipment and would bring these countries into compliance with U.S. sanctions against Russia's defense industry.



QUICK WIN: Announce an end to the trade war with the EU. On day one, the next administration should announce they will work to end the trade war with the EU.



OVERARCHING POLICY:

Embrace Mexico early and often

Mexico is a critical, strategic, and longtime U.S. partner and needs to be treated as such, especially following the contentious and nativist rhetoric of recent years. Mexico is also the United States' top trading partner. North American supply chains are key to U.S. manufacturing and resilience. The integration of U.S. and Mexican energy supply chains has critical implications for energy security and climate change, and Mexican agriculture and agricultural workers are critical to U.S. food security. Although the southwest U.S. border is temporarily closed for nonessential travel, in normal times, more people legally enter the United States from Mexico than from any other country, making it a key de facto partner on COVID-19 resilience. It is also a critical partner for managing migration—from the Americas as well as from around the world—into the United States.⁷

Helping Mexico build up its capacity to manage this migration and to provide asylum and host refugees in a fair and humane manner will be critical in the coming years. To do so, in its first 100 days, the next administration should:



QUICK WIN: Meet with the president of Mexico before Inauguration Day. The president should then also make an official trip to Mexico in the early months of the administration.



QUICK WIN: Prioritize the nomination of a U.S. ambassador to Mexico as part of the first slate of nominations in the early days of the administration. The appointee should also be immensely qualified and an expert on the country with strong ties to the U.S. president.

- **Ensure that the secretaries of state, homeland security, energy, and commerce each visit Mexico within the administration's first 100 days or convene virtually if health restrictions prevent travel.** The secretaries should coordinate their visits to pursue a productive and forward-looking policy agenda.
- **Announce a set of joint U.S.-Mexico initiatives on migration and COVID-19 response.** To ensure public safety and maintain the flow of commerce and people that supports both economies, the United States and Mexico will need to follow the advice of public health experts, closely coordinate with each other, and make sure that long-established cross-border lifestyles are not affected or become a factor in contributing to the spread of the virus. The United States should also announce a new set of assistance—financial, logistical, and more—to help Mexico manage its migration in a humane way. This would include building up Mexico's internal asylum system, building up capacity on the Mexican side of the U.S. border, and encouraging a humanitarian rather than a solely enforcement-based response on Mexico's southern border.



OVERARCHING POLICY:

Place U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific on a stronger foundation for the future

The Trump administration's approach to America's allies in Asia has been upside down; the administration has treated our democratic allies with disdain while embracing authoritarian leaders who are working to erode their countries' democratic institutions. President Trump's approach to South Korea has bordered on hostile, with repeated attempts to extort our ally for more money, ridicule the importance of the alliances and the U.S. troop presence, and often cut Seoul out of diplomacy with North Korea.⁸

Australia and Japan, while not suffering nearly as badly as other U.S. allies around the world, have had dustups with the current Trump administration and been the targets of tariffs. To facilitate putting U.S. alliances on a stronger footing for the future, the next administration should prioritize the following steps in the first 100 days:

- **Plan a joint visit of the secretaries of state and defense, when safe to do so, to top U.S. democratic allies in the Asia-Pacific: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.** The primary goal of the trip will be to reassure these core allies and listen to their concerns about the trajectory of key challenges facing the region. It will be a chance for the next administration to move away from the transactional approach of the current administration.



QUICK WIN: Immediately suspend cost-sharing negotiations with Japan and the Republic of Korea until after an assessment can be made on the future of U.S. defense strategy. While burden-sharing is important for the sustainability of our alliances, the Trump administration has attempted to use these negotiations to extort U.S. allies for political purposes. The next administration will need to reexamine its defense strategy in the region, prioritize long-term cost-sharing agreements that are fair, and address the concerns of Japan and Korea, as well as the United States.

- **Announce support for fully funding the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in the FY 2022 budget submission.**⁹ Earlier this year, the U.S. Senate passed the bipartisan Pacific Deterrence Initiative—a multibillion-dollar, multiyear fund to improve U.S. deterrence against China. The administration should demonstrate support for this effort by including funding for this initiative in its FY 2022 budget request.



OVERARCHING POLICY:

Actively engage with African nations

The African continent has historically been a low priority for U.S. foreign policy. Yet the continent is home to about half of the world's fastest-growing economies, with 20 African economies expected to expand at an average rate of 5 percent or more over the next five years. Also expanding is Africa's population, which is expected to double from 1.2 billion to 2.4 billion by 2050.¹⁰ From climate change and pandemic responses to cybergovernance, African countries will play a significant role in the future of global affairs. What happens in Africa does not stop at the water's edge, as recent examples with piracy, migration, and Ebola demonstrate. In a crowded policy landscape, Africa offers both opportunities and challenges. The United States would

be wise to partner with African nations on trade, investment, and innovation and should prioritize support to African democracies. The United States should also work bilaterally and multilaterally with African nations to prevent and mitigate threats from terrorism, criminality, epidemics, and mass migration. The next administration must engage with African countries and people in productive partnerships that are based on mutual respect for democratic principles and inclusive growth. To advance such a vision, in the first 100 days, the next administration should:

- **Release a presidential policy directive on U.S. policy toward Africa.** This policy directive should outline a new U.S. diplomatic, security, and economic approach to the African continent that prioritizes sustainable development, including a focus on clean energy development and support for countries to adapt to climate change impacts.
- **Send a high-level U.S. delegation to visit key democratic African countries.** The next administration needs to send a strong signal after the current administration's neglect. Once travel is permitted, the vice president should lead a high-level U.S. delegation to visit key democratic African countries to signal a new era in productive relations as well as signal America's renewed commitment to democracy.
- **Announce that the White House will host the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2022 and regularize every four years.** A U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit has not been held since 2014. Announcing the intention to restart these summits will demonstrate a high-level commitment to furthering ties between Washington and African capitals. The priorities for the summit should include trade, investment, and innovation and should underscore America's commitment to the continent's people, democracy, and security.

Compete more effectively with China

The next administration will confront not only an extraordinarily contentious U.S.-China relationship but also a largely ineffective national strategy when it comes to delivering results for the American people. The next administration should take stock of the U.S. approach, engage with allies and partners, and fashion a more collective approach to dealing with the challenges that China presents. The Trump administration's approach to China has made American prosperity and security contingent on Beijing's willingness to change its behavior; has failed to work with allies and partners to form a common cause; and has failed to make much-needed investments at home that would enable the United States to compete over the long term. To recalibrate this dynamic, the next administration must signal a complete shift to a more effective U.S. strategy. To implement such a shift in the first 100 days, the next administration should:



QUICK WIN: Prioritize nominating a U.S. ambassador to China in the first slate of ambassadorial nominations. A trusted adviser to the president who is in full agreement with the next administration's approach to China policy should be among the early slate of ambassadorial nominations.

- **Engage key U.S. allies on China to solicit their input on a new U.S. strategy and begin laying the groundwork for a more collective approach.** The president should also send a top U.S. national security team—including senior directors for Asia and China from the National Security Council, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense—to Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada in the first month of the next administration—or, pending health restrictions, convene virtually. The goal of these meetings should be to seek allied input and alignment before any new U.S. China strategy is released.
- **Develop and roll out a new U.S. strategy on China.** Given the scale of the challenges presented by China, the United States should launch a White House-led policy review on China beginning on day one. At the 100-day mark, this group should present the outline of the new China policy to the president, with buy-in from allies and key stakeholder groups.

- **Stand up a new White House-led Task Force on American Competitiveness to design and implement a National Competitiveness Initiative.** The objective of the task force should be to design a multiyear plan to improve U.S. economic competitiveness in order to better compete with China and other economies that are engaged in advanced manufacturing, including action to direct and fund basic research, bridge the gap between research and industrial applications, transfer new technology to small and medium enterprises, and support workforce development for noncollege workers. The restoration of manufacturing jobs as a good source of middle-class incomes—and development of the green technology that will be needed to deal with climate change—should be central goals. This task force should be led by domestic staff but cut across the Executive Office of the President and include representatives from the Domestic Policy Council, the National Climate Council,¹¹ the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, the U.S. Trade Representative, and other relevant departments and agencies. This task force should work in close cooperation with the U.S. Congress, labor groups, the business community, and the academic community.
- **Launch a new, more multilateral trade approach on China.** The next administration should seek to break from the unilateral trade war launched by the current Trump administration and instead design and implement a more multilateral approach to more effectively address China's egregious economic and trade behavior. This could include taking collective action at the World Trade Organization, including by filing a nullification and impairment case against China. It could also include launching a reconsideration of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements to make them consistent with domestic steps needed to restore U.S. manufacturing competitiveness and to incorporate labor and environmental standards in an effective manner. The next administration should carefully consider how to leverage any reduction in U.S. trade tariffs against China to support this more collective approach.



QUICK WIN: Send an early, supportive U.S. signal to both Hong Kong and Taiwan. The next administration should consider some early policy moves in support of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Examples of the moves could include high-level U.S. official engagements with Taiwanese officials, the granting of Temporary Protected Status and special immigration status to the people of Hong Kong, presidential-level statements of support for democratic rights, and other diplomatic initiatives.



QUICK WIN: Invite Chinese human rights advocates to the White House for a meeting with the president. This meeting should address ways to pressure China on its atrocious treatment of millions of Uighur Muslims currently in concentration camps. This meeting should also serve as a vehicle for the next administration to announce U.S. sanctions against individuals and entities that contribute to the repression of Uighurs in China.



QUICK WIN: Rejoin the World Health Organization, the U.N. Human Rights Council, and the Paris Climate Agreement and engage more actively in these and other international forums. China is currently taking advantage of the U.S. absence and lack of initiative in multilateral institutions. The next administration should immediately reengage and seek to rejoin international forums in order to counter China's influence.

- **Raise the bar on China's climate change commitments.** U.S. withdrawal from the Paris agreement and backtracking on climate change action has ceded reputational and substantive leadership on climate to China. The next administration should pair ambitious domestic policies with coordinated international initiatives to raise the standards for China to achieve on its own actions. As part of their domestic climate policies, for example, the United States and the EU could both agree to adopt a carbon border adjustment tax, which would increase the import price of Chinese goods produced using high-emission processes. Early action in the first 100 days on both domestic and international coordination on climate change would help shift the dynamic toward greater U.S. leadership.

Stand up to Russia

Russia is actively seeking to undermine the United States and its democratic allies, especially in Europe, and there are few boundaries Russia is not willing to cross. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has declared itself an adversary of the United States and should be treated as such. The Trump administration has spent the past four years enabling Putin to advance his international agenda, sowing discord and division among democracies and international institutions. The next administration will need to end that pattern and establish new redlines in the relationship. To deter Russia, costs need to be imposed for its belligerent behavior and gross violations of international law. While there will be little room to reset relations or remove sanctions, that does not mean the United States should not engage with Russia, particularly on areas of potential cooperation, including arms control and extending the New START Treaty. However, there will need to be a dramatic shift in the U.S. posture toward Russia. The next administration will have to engage democratic allies to jointly protect against destabilizing acts and interference, including illicit financial flows emanating from Russia. (see the “Living Our Democratic Values” section of this report) In the first 100 days, the next administration should:

- **Announce new sanctions against key Kremlin backers and pledge to fully implement U.S. sanctions laws.** The Trump administration has failed to adequately implement the 2017 sanctions legislation against Russia. Instead, the administration has rolled back sanctions against key Russian oligarchs. The next administration should send an immediate message to the Kremlin’s oligarch backers, many of whom keep their funds in the West, that doing so has a price. The administration should also review and assess past sanctions and make recommendations for additional action. Existing illicit finance tools at the U.S. Department of the Treasury could also be used to expose kleptocrats who pursue the Kremlin’s agenda in democracies.
- **Directly engage the Russian people with a presidential video address.** While taking a harder line against President Putin’s government, it will be important to continue to try to engage and enable people-to-people contacts with the Russian people and avoid xenophobic treatment of Russians in the United States and around the world.

- **Send a show of support to the intelligence community by visiting the CIA’s Russia House.** The Trump administration has attacked the intelligence community and frequently dismissed its work related to Russia. Once such a visit is possible, or virtually, the president should meet with CIA staff and the National Intelligence Council and thank them for their efforts, making it clear that the next administration highly values their work.



QUICK WIN: Announce U.S. opposition to Russia returning to the Group of Eight (G8). The next administration should make an early announcement that it will oppose any Russian reentry into the G8.

- **Call for Russia to be suspended from Interpol.** The United States should work to suspend Russia from Interpol for abusing the organization for political purposes.



QUICK WIN: Send a presidential letter to Putin that reestablishes redlines. The president should send a letter to President Putin to lay out U.S. concerns with respect to Russia’s destabilizing and illegal behavior, including its interference in the U.S. presidential elections, its ongoing foreign election interference, as well as its destabilizing actions in places such as Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya. The letter should also signal that the U.S. vice president will be the designated point person for managing the U.S. relationship with Russia, distancing it from the president.



QUICK WIN: Execute a major U.S. military exercise on the Russian periphery. The U.S. Department of Defense should conduct a major military exercise in the first 100 days to underscore U.S. resolve to defend U.S. allies and deter Russian aggression.

- **Work with Congress to make Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty an independent nongovernmental organization.** This would allow for it to receive a direct appropriation from Congress that will ensure its integrity and independence. It would also enable it to deliver truthful information to the Russian people—and others on the continent—on their government’s policies and conduct.

Recalibrate relations with backsliding allies, toxic partners, and long-standing adversaries

The next administration should signal to adversaries that it is open to dialogue—but not at a cost to U.S. values or national security interests. U.S. engagement should be strategic and purpose driven, whether on relations with North Korea and Iran or on other issues such as arms control negotiations with Russia. Ultimately, engagement cannot be an end in and of itself or driven by narrow domestic political purposes. It must be targeted toward a tangible goal of advancing U.S. national security. Instead of engaging adversaries right away, the next administration should seek to strengthen its global position, increase its leverage, and coordinate with allies before offering abrupt and ill-thought-out diplomatic overtures.



OVERARCHING POLICY:

Deleverage the United States from Turkey

The next administration should work to actively deleverage itself from its relationship with Turkey, especially on security matters. While Turkey will remain a major player in both the Middle East and Europe, the next administration should send early signals that it will be taking a new approach. In the first 100 days, the next administration should:

- **Remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.** President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to chart a more independent course with less deference to traditional Western security partners. He has adopted a transactional approach toward relations with the United States and Europe and deepened ties with Iran, China, and Russia. Turkey is choosing a more independent, assertive path. The next administration should recognize this reality and adapt. That does not mean lurching to a purely punitive approach—but given the depth of corruption and autocracy in Turkey, it does mean the United States should work to reduce its reliance on Ankara. As a first step, the next administration should work to quietly remove all nuclear weapons from Incirlik Air Base. And it should be done immediately, without a lengthy interagency review, to allow the administration to attempt to rebuild relations from a more realistic foundation.

- **Launch a broad U.S. policy review on Turkey.** This review should address all dimensions of the relationship, including security, economic, and diplomatic relations. The goal should be to craft a more realistic and updated strategy for dealing with a more assertive Turkey that is willing to take unilateral action and defy alliance norms.



OVERARCHING POLICY:

Reset U.S. relationships with Gulf partners

The United States has had long and complicated relationships with many of its Gulf partners, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. The Trump administration has essentially written a blank check to some of these partners, resulting in disastrous consequences for U.S. interests, deepened humanitarian crises, and long-term moral implications for U.S. policy.¹² While practical cooperation will be necessary to deal with everything from Iran's destabilizing behavior to Arab-Israeli peace, and even COVID-19, the next administration should take stock of whether U.S. interests are being well served by the status quo and take some early steps to signal a new approach. In the first 100 days, the next administration should:



QUICK WIN: Suspend U.S. military assistance and arms sales to Saudi Arabia related to the war in Yemen. The next administration should immediately suspend arms sale and U.S. military assistance, in line with bipartisan congressional legislation, to countries engaged in the destructive war in Yemen that has resulted in untold devastation and civilian atrocities. It should also suspend U.S. operational and targeting support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.



QUICK WIN: Dispatch the secretary of state to visit key Gulf partners. The next administration should task the secretary of state with engaging on a new regional diplomatic strategy, including expressions of U.S. support for emerging Gulf-Iran diplomatic channels, conflict resolution and humanitarian relief in Yemen, efforts to mend the rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council, and expanded Iraq-Gulf ties.

- **Launch a review of U.S. military posture in the Gulf region to consider how to more effectively and sustainably deter Iran in the context of other global priorities.** It is increasingly clear that more U.S. military presence in the region is not necessarily deterring Iran. This review should assess the U.S. military footprint with an eye toward a more defensive posture that provides necessary core deterrence but that relies more heavily on Gulf partners' self-defense.

- **Convene deputies to recommend options for holding Saudi Arabia responsible for the death of lawful U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi.** The next administration should hold a deputies-level meeting to consider U.S. government intelligence and other information regarding the 2018 death of U.S. permanent resident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi and recommend options for taking punitive steps to hold responsible Saudi leadership accountable.

New U.S. policy principles for North Korea and Iran

In addition to the actions described in this section, the next administration should strive for greater stability in its relationships with North Korea and Iran. The following principles should guide the next administration's efforts.

North Korea

- Signal a willingness to engage North Korea diplomatically, but don't agree to a summit absent meaningful diplomatic progress.
- Engage Seoul on new diplomatic way forward.
- Support North-South diplomacy.
- Jump-start trilateral coordination between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Iran

- Prioritize principled diplomacy.
- Leverage U.S. reentry to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
- Deescalate tensions.
- Support Gulf-Iran rapprochement.

Conclusion

At the start of this new decade, the United States will need to restore, reset, and reexamine its relationships with its democratic allies and partners, with authoritarian challengers, and with toxic partners and long-standing adversaries. A new, principled approach will require better alignment with democratic values, partnerships to halt aggression from U.S. adversaries, and relationships that prioritize shared values rather than shared interests.



New executive orders or policies recommended in the first 100 days:

- Launch a policy review and develop a new U.S. strategy on China.
- Create a Task Force on American Competitiveness to design and implement a National Competitiveness Initiative.
- Release a presidential policy directive on U.S. policy toward Africa that prioritizes sustainable development and a focus on adapting to climate change.
- Launch a broad policy review on Turkey.

Endnotes

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