Center for American Progress

What Would It Take To Stabilize the Debt-to-GDP Ratio?
Report

What Would It Take To Stabilize the Debt-to-GDP Ratio?

Because most of the Bush-era tax cuts were permanently extended, the United States is projected to have the debt ratio rise indefinitely. Closing this fiscal gap would require decreasing primary deficits by 2.1 percentage points of GDP, on average.

In this article
Top of the Capitol building
The U.S. Capitol is seen on September 27, 2021, in Washington. (Getty/Win McNamee)
Also read

The United States is on track to have the federal government’s debt rise indefinitely, thanks to the bipartisan extension of the Bush-era tax cuts in 2013. Ever since the vast majority of them were made permanent, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has projected that the debt ratio—debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)—will continue to rise rather than fall.1 Because of this long-term, upward growth of the debt ratio, the country has a fiscal gap—estimated to be 2.1 percent of GDP over the next 30 years.2

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

In other words, if the primary (or noninterest) deficit were, on average, 2.1 percent of GDP lower every year for the next 30 years, the 2054 debt ratio would be the same level it is now.

This issue brief explains what the fiscal gap is, how it is calculated, and what is required to achieve debt ratio stability in the long run.

The CBO’s long-term budget outlook

Every year, the CBO releases a projection of the budget outlook for 30-plus years into the future. This document, known as the long-term budget outlook, makes a handful of different budgetary and economic estimates. These include revenues, various components of spending, deficits, and debt. They also include GDP growth, the interest rate on government debt, and inflation.3

For the first 10 years, the budgetary projections follow the laws that dictate how the CBO must construct the 10-year baseline it uses to produce budget scoring estimates of legislation. This is colloquially known as the “current law” baseline, although there are myriad rules and exceptions.4 The economic projections in the long-term budget outlook match the most recent set of economic projections made by the CBO. After the 10th year, the CBO typically applies long-term historical trends in projecting both budgetary and economic estimates.

All budgetary data in the long-term budget outlook are presented as percentages of GDP. The annual GDP is the total value of all goods and services produced in the economy each year. Showing figures as percentages of GDP therefore shows budget numbers—such as what the government spends or taxes—relative to the overall size of the entire economy. In general, it makes budgetary comparisons more comparable over time because it definitionally shows whether something is small or large in comparison to how much the nation is producing.

For example, it would not be particularly analytically meaningful to adjust for inflation the deficits that the United States ran during World War II. In 1943, the U.S. deficit reached an all-time high of 29.6 percent of GDP. In dollar terms after adjusting for inflation, that deficit would be only $779 billion in today’s dollars—less than half the current projected deficit (after adjusting for timing shifts). But as a percentage of GDP, the deficit in 1943 is more than four times bigger than today’s deficit.5

The fiscal gap estimate in this brief measures what it would take to ensure no long-term growth in the debt ratio under the CBO’s long-term projections.

The fiscal gap

Many budget experts and economists argue that all else being equal, the budget should, among its many priorities, achieve a stable or declining debt ratio during good economic times.6 Debt ratio stability means that the size of the debt is growing no faster than the size of the economy. The debt is the cumulative amount of deficits and surpluses the United States has run since its beginning. The debt ratio is the ratio of that debt to the size of the nation’s economy.

In 1994, economist Alan Auerbach invented the concept of the fiscal gap to measure what it would take to prevent the debt ratio from rising in the long run.7 The fiscal gap measures the net present value (the cumulative value in today’s dollars) of the amount of primary deficit reduction as a percentage of GDP necessary to ensure that the debt at the end of a selected time period is no higher than at the beginning of the time period.8 In other words, it shows the present-day value of required, cumulative primary savings over the time period divided by the present-day value of cumulative GDP over the time period. This deficit reduction can be achieved by increasing projected revenues, decreasing program spending, or some combination of the two.

The fiscal gap is always presented in primary, or noninterest, deficit terms because interest payments flow from existing debt and projected deficits and therefore cannot be directly changed. That is, short of defaulting on its interest payments, the United States may not simply choose to pay less interest; the way to pay less interest is by reducing projected deficits and therefore debt.

In 2024, the 30-year fiscal gap is 2.1 percent of GDP. In fiscal year 2024, debt net of financial assets is projected to be 90.8 percent of GDP, growing to 170.5 percent of GDP in 2054.9 So, if primary deficits averaged 2.1 percent of GDP less per year for the next 30 years, debt in 2054 would instead likewise be 90.8 percent of GDP.

How changes in budgetary and economic assumptions can affect the fiscal gap

There are four factors that determine debt ratio stability: 1) how large the projected primary deficits are; 2) the starting (and therefore target ending) level of the debt ratio; 3) the rate of GDP growth; and 4) the interest rate at which the government borrows new debt.10 If any of these factors change, the fiscal gap will also change.

If projected primary deficits increase, the fiscal gap will increase. If the starting (and therefore target ending) debt ratio is higher, the fiscal gap will be smaller.11 If projected GDP growth is higher, the fiscal gap will be lower. If projected interest rates are higher, the fiscal gap will be higher.

Because the fiscal gap is shown in net present value terms, lowering the projected debt ratio in 2054 down to the 2024 level of 2.1 percent of GDP could be achieved by attaining:

  • That same amount of primary deficit reduction as a percentage of GDP each year.
  • More primary deficit reduction upfront and less at the end.
  • Less primary deficit reduction upfront and more at the end.
  • A varying amount of primary deficit reduction throughout the period.

As long as the present-day primary deficit averages 2.1 percent of GDP, each of these options would close the fiscal gap.

As these figures show, closing the fiscal gap need not mean a stable debt ratio every single year. As stated earlier in the brief, the specific projected primary deficit path, debt ratio level, economic growth, and interest rates on new government debt determine what is necessary for debt ratio stability in each year. Figure 2 below shows the primary deficit reduction path that would achieve debt ratio stability each year, as well as what level of primary deficits the budget can run while still achieving debt ratio stability. In present value terms, the path that achieves debt ratio stability in each year is the size of the fiscal gap—2.1 percent of GDP. However, because of the specific projected primary deficit path and economic projections, by the end of the 30-year budget window, debt ratio stabilization requires primary deficit reduction of 2.04 percent of GDP.

Using the right starting point for calculating the fiscal gap

Importantly, in order to be estimated correctly, the fiscal gap must be measured from data that have no macrodynamic feedback from the effect of debt. In its baseline projections, the CBO assumes that debt has a modestly negative effect on the economy and thus on the budget. The CBO assumes that debt crowds out private investment. As a result, it projects that rising debt leads to lower growth and higher interest rates. The lower growth and higher interest rates lead to lower revenues as a percentage of GDP due to lower real wage growth. And the lower growth and higher interest rates lead both to higher primary spending and higher interest spending as a percentage of GDP due to lower real GDP growth and higher borrowing costs. The CBO builds these effects into both its 10-year baselines and its 30-year long-term budget outlooks.

However, if that growth in the debt ratio were never to occur, the negative effects one might assume growing debt could entail would similarly never occur. Indeed, the CBO notes:

[F]iscal gap estimates … are calculated without economic feedback effects. It would not be informative to include the negative economic effects of rising debt (and their feedback effects on the budget) in the fiscal gap calculation because the fiscal gap shows the budgetary changes required to keep debt from rising in the first place; if those budgetary changes were made, the negative economic effects (and their feedback effects on the budget) would not occur.12

Put differently, if fiscal gap calculations were made from the CBO’s standard long-term budget outlook, that would entail working from estimates that include the negative macrodynamic effect of debt ratio growth but no commensurate offsetting positive macrodynamic effect of undoing that debt ratio growth.

Calculating the fiscal gap from a projection that assumes the negative consequences from debt incorrectly produces a significant overestimate. Estimated correctly, using the CBO’s published backup data that remove the macrodynamic effects of debt, the fiscal gap is 2.1 percent of GDP. Estimated incorrectly, using the CBO’s long-term budget outlook that includes the CBO’s macrodynamic effects of debt rather than its published backup data that remove the macrodynamic effects, the fiscal gap would appear to be 2.6 percent of GDP, with 2.9 percent of GDP appearing to be required to stabilize the debt ratio at the end of the forecast period.

Conclusion

A series of massive tax cuts skewed toward the rich enacted since 2001 are the reason the United States moved from having no fiscal gap to having one. If Congress wishes to work toward debt ratio stability, it should look first at reversing tax cuts that largely have benefited the wealthy.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Jean Ross, Brendan Duke, Madeline Shepherd, and Emily Gee for their helpful suggestions.

Glossary

Debt: Amount of borrowed money the government owes.

Debt net of financial assets: Debt held by the public minus the government’s financial assets.

Debt ratio: Debt divided by GDP.

Deficit: The difference between how much the government spends and how much tax revenue the government raises.

Fiscal gap: The net present value of the amount of primary deficit reduction as a percentage of the net present value of GDP over a given time period that is necessary for the debt ratio at the end of the period to be the same level that it was at the beginning of the period.

Primary deficit: The deficit excluding interest costs—in other words, the difference between how much noninterest spending the government does and how much tax revenue the government raises.

Endnotes

  1. Bobby Kogan, “Tax Cuts Are Primarily Responsible for the Increasing Debt Ratio” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2023), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tax-cuts-are-primarily-responsible-for-the-increasing-debt-ratio/.
  2. This calculation was made from a slightly adjusted version of the CBO’s March 2024 long-term budget outlook, based on debt net of financial assets. The authors have incorporated the budget side deals that Congress used in enacting fiscal year 2024 appropriations, which they assume will be used in enacting fiscal year 2025 appropriations; the CBO did not assume adherence to these side deals and so assumed lower appropriations than intended by those who negotiated the deals. The adjusted projection also sets disaster-related funding to match historical averages as a percentage of GDP, and it removes the extrapolation of any other emergency funding (with the exception of emergency-designated money that is intended to fund ongoing base operations). Calculations were made using data from Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2024 to 2054” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59711; Congressional Budget Office, “How Changes in Funding for the IRS Affect Revenues” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59972; Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710; Congressional Budget Office, “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-03/FCAA_2024-Divs_A-G.pdf; Congressional Budget Office, “CBO Estimate for HR-4366AR, Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2024,” March 11, 2024, on file with author; Congressional Budget Office, “CBO Estimate for HR-4366CJ, Division C – Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,” March 11, 2024, on file with author; Congressional Budget Office, “CBO Estimate for HR-2882FS, Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2024,” March 22, 2024, on file with author; Congressional Budget Office, “CBO Estimate for HR-4366IN, Div. E Dept. of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations A,” March 11, 2024, on file with author; Congressional Budget Office, “CBO Estimate for HR-2882LA, Labor, HHS, Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2024,” March 22, 2024, on file with author; Richard Kogan, senior fellow, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, personal communication with author via email and phone, April 21, 2024, on file with author and updated by author; Congressional Budget Office, “Budgetary Outcomes Under Alternative Assumptions About Spending and Revenues” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60114; Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook Under Alternative Scenarios for the Economy and the Budget” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60169.
  3. Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2024 to 2054.”
  4. For example, discretionary funding is assumed to grow with inflation, certain laws that are perennially extended are assumed to be extended, and trust funds with dedicated revenues are assumed to be able to meet their obligations regardless of the solvency of those trust funds.
  5. Authors’ analysis based on Office of Management and Budget, “Table 1.2—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930–2029” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/ (last accessed May 2024); Office of Management and Budget, “Table 10.1—Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical Tables: 1940–2029” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/ (last accessed May 2024); Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034.”
  6. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Policy Basics: Deficits, Debt, and Interest” (Washington), available at https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/deficits-debt-and-interest (last accessed April 2024).
  7. Alan J. Auerbach, “The U.S. Fiscal Problem: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We’re Going,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 9 (1994): 141–186, available at https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c11009/c11009.pdf.
  8. To put figures in 2024 dollars, future values are discounted using the CBO’s projected average Treasury interest rate on new federal debt. Figures were calculated using data from Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook Under Alternative Scenarios for the Economy and the Budget.”
  9. In this analysis, debt refers to the U.S. government’s debt net of the government’s financial assets, such as accumulated cash, gold, and the value to the government of its outstanding loan assets (money borrowed from the government). While government debt is sometimes measured other ways, net debt is the only measure that grows each year by that year’s deficit; it is the only measure of debt that is consistent with the way deficits are measured and the only measure that shows the net financial position of the U.S. government at any given point in time.
  10. Richard Kogan and others, “Difference Between Economic Growth Rates and Treasury Interest Rates Significantly Affects Long-Term Budget Outlook” (Washington: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015), available at https://www.cbpp.org/research/difference-between-economic-growth-rates-and-treasury-interest-rates-significantly-affects.
  11. Imagine a scenario where G (the nominal growth rate of GDP) is greater than R (the compound interest rate on government debt)—which is the normal scenario in U.S. history. See Richard Kogan’s analysis for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Ibid. Typically, having G greater than R would create room to run a primary deficit of small enough size and still have a stable debt ratio. However, if debt is zero, primary balance is necessary, even with G greater than R—because any primary deficit would create debt. The greater the starting debt ratio, the larger primary deficit any given G > R scenario would allow while still achieving debt ratio stability.
  12. Congressional Budget Office, “The 2014 Long-Term Budget Outlook” (Washington: 2014), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45471.

The positions of American Progress, and our policy experts, are independent, and the findings and conclusions presented are those of American Progress alone. A full list of supporters is available here. American Progress would like to acknowledge the many generous supporters who make our work possible.

Authors

Bobby Kogan

Senior Director, Federal Budget Policy

Jessica Vela

Research Associate, Inclusive Economy

Team

A subway train pulls into the Flushing Avenue station in Brooklyn.

Inclusive Economy

We are focused on building an inclusive economy by expanding worker power, investing in families, and advancing a social compact that encourages sustainable and equitable growth.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.