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The Road to Baku, Belém, and Beyond: A 5-Year Outlook for U.S. International Climate Finance
Report

The Road to Baku, Belém, and Beyond: A 5-Year Outlook for U.S. International Climate Finance

The United States must work to establish an ambitious new international climate finance goal this year at COP29 as part of a five-year plan to scale resources to combat the climate crisis.

Tackling Climate Change and Environmental Injustice, Climate Change, Climate Diplomacy, +1 More

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In this article
Construction worker onsite
The government is working on developing the facades of buildings in preparation for receiving visitors to the climate summit on June 1, 2024, in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Getty/Fadel Dawod)

Introduction and summary

The nations of the world took a historic step in 2023 at the conclusion of the annual U.N. climate change conference by agreeing to “[transition] away from fossil fuels in energy systems”1 and establishing targets to triple renewable energy capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030.2 These pledges serve as benchmarks on the way to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, which is required3 to stay within the global temperature rise limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels as set out in the Paris Agreement. Although it is clear that the world must stop emitting greenhouse gases in order to halt climate change, how to finance the transition to clean energy while meeting global energy needs is less clear. Estimates indicate achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 requires $7.3 trillion in annual investments, for a total of nearly $200 trillion.4 This figure represents only part of the climate finance need; in addition to mitigating emissions to slow global temperature rise, communities must increase resilience to adverse climate impacts that are already being felt today.

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The United States and the wider developed world must determine how to meet these global resource needs in the lead-up to this year’s conference—formally called the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29)—where climate finance will be a key priority.5 A new climate finance target, called the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), will be determined6 for developed countries to contribute to developing countries. Developed nations, with their larger and more advanced economies, are better positioned to finance climate action. Yet these global clean energy and emissions reduction targets will be missed—and the 1.5-degree Celsius limit exceeded—if countries do not transition together. Therefore, it is critical that the United States commit to and deliver on an ambitious NCQG to support developing countries in achieving these targets as well.

However, financing the transition is about more than the year ahead; while this year in the lead-up to COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, is particularly consequential for international climate finance, the United States must take a five-year outlook to meaningfully shape the climate finance landscape in order to increase available resources and meet climate finance pledges. This show of international leadership has implications for the United States beyond climate, including countering China’s influence abroad, strengthening relationships with strategic allies, and remaining economically competitive in a rapidly changing world. It could also influence the climate action plans, called Nationally Determined Contributions, that countries will submit to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) ahead of COP30 in Belém, Brazil,7 as transparency around available resources and the promise of reliable delivery of financing could encourage a higher level of ambition on climate action from developing countries. Therefore, the United States must:

  • Leverage international climate leadership to advance an ambitious NCQG at COP29.
  • Develop a cross-government plan through an interagency process to ensure timely delivery of new climate finance commitments, including strategic bilateral climate finance investments for the next five years, under the NCQG.
  • Capitalize on the upcoming congressional reauthorizations of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Export-Import Bank (EXIM) to stop new financing of fossil fuel projects abroad in keeping with the United States’ international commitments.

This report provides policymakers with a broad overview of the global landscape of climate finance, with a focus on UNFCCC negotiations, and examines the role of the United States in this landscape, including U.S. international climate finance commitments, the channels through which U.S. climate finance is mobilized, and the continued U.S. financing of fossil fuel projects abroad. It culminates in recommendations for delivering on an ambitious five-year strategy to meet climate finance commitments.

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The climate finance gap

Achieving net-zero emissions globally by 2050 is estimated to require $7.3 trillion in annual investments, for a total of nearly $200 trillion.8 Focusing on a 2030 timescale still requires staggering investments. Tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030 is estimated at $1.5 trillion9 per year, nearly threefold10 the amount spent on increasing renewable energy capacity in 2023. Doubling energy efficiency is projected to require $14.24 trillion in investments11 cumulatively from 2023 to 2030, yet only $700 billion12 was spent on energy efficiency from 2020 to 2023.

Mitigating emissions is only part of the climate finance equation: Resources are also required to help countries increase resilience for climate impacts that are happening today. The financing gap for adaptation, which is funded less13 overall than mitigation, is estimated to be $194 billion to $366 billion per year.14

Another element of climate finance involves providing resources to countries that have already experienced damages from climate change impacts. Countries last year operationalized a fund for this purpose at COP28 that has a specific mandate to provide compensation to climate-vulnerable countries that have suffered both economic and noneconomic damage15 from climate events such as extreme weather and sea level rise. The fund drew $700 million16 in contributions, yet with loss and damage estimated at $400 billion per year,17 the fund’s current total equals only 0.18 percent of the need.

Although public investment in international climate finance must increase, public financing alone is insufficient to meet the need; private financing must increase to help close the gap. Private financing currently accounts for 49 percent18 of international climate finance, yet public financing can be leveraged as a tool to unlock more private capital by reducing risk to private investors.19 This approach, called blended finance, can be achieved through using public resources as guarantees, as first-loss capital, or to enhance credit.

The global landscape of international climate finance

Multilateral institutions and forums serve as critical venues for climate finance negotiations, resulting in climate finance targets and funding vehicles. In 2009, at COP15, the developed world collectively committed to mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020.20 Although this is a significant sum, the $100 billion-per-year target falls far short of the estimated $2.4 trillion21 needed per year in climate financing from 2026 to 2030, which would require more than tripling22 the amount of climate finance mobilized in 2022. The $100 billion figure served as a politically symbolic23 show of support from nations that have contributed the most to the climate crisis to nations that have contributed the least. Still, developed countries met24 the goal two years late, in 2022. Parties agreed in 201525 to set the NCQG before COP30, and these negotiations will conclude this year26 at COP29.

In addition to mitigation and adaptation finance, loss and damage financing is required to support countries rebuilding from extreme weather and slow-onset events such as sea level rise. Affected countries have been seeking this financing since the 1990s,27 and their efforts culminated on the first day of COP28 with the operationalization of a loss and damage fund.28 This fund has a specific mandate to provide compensation to climate-vulnerable countries that have suffered both economic and noneconomic damages from climate change impacts.29 Negotiations in the lead-up to the fund’s implementation were notably contentious, with the United States identified as a source of resistance30 for requesting compensation be divorced from admission of legal liability31 and for the fund to be administered by the World Bank,32 which the United States heavily influences as its largest shareholder.33 The United States pledged $17.5 million34—which climate justice advocates35 viewed as woefully inadequate coming from the largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases and a wealthy developed country—upon the fund’s establishment.

Multilateral development banks are another channel through which climate finance is mobilized. These institutions, which are focused on ending poverty and catalyzing economic prosperity, are well-positioned to invest resources in mitigation and adaptation projects given their relationship with developing countries, their significant resources, and their efforts to help countries develop sustainably. From 2015 to 2022, multilateral development banks invested $287 billion in climate finance.36 The World Bank is the largest source37 of climate finance, mobilizing $38.6 billion38 in fiscal year 2023 alone—a 22 percent39 increase from the previous year and marking a record year for climate finance. Despite this flow of resources into countries, a report estimates that in 2023, developing countries paid more to service their debt40 than they received in aid, preventing them from prioritizing climate action.41

Given this conundrum, there are louder calls for reforming multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions to better respond to the complex challenge of climate change. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen has voiced support42 on behalf of the United States to reform the World Bank and the larger multilateral development bank system to better respond to modern-day challenges, including climate change. At the annual spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in April 2024, Yellen noted progress on this front, including the World Bank’s goal to dedicate 45 percent43 of its overall spending in FY 2025—compared with the current 41 percent44—to climate finance and the release of new data45 on the bank’s callable capital, or commitment from shareholders to provide funds to cover the bank’s financial obligations in extreme circumstances.46 Yet Yellen also recognized that further changes are needed to better support developing countries and emerging economies. She identified areas for improvement,47 including increasing flows of private capital, revamping staff priorities to increase emphasis on crowding in private capital, and decreasing bureaucracy.

U.S. international climate finance commitments

At the beginning of his term, President Joe Biden committed to scaling up U.S. international climate finance to $11.4 billion per year by 2024,48 with $3 billion dedicated to adaptation.49 The U.S. Department of State’s preliminary estimates for 2023 put the Biden administration’s international climate finance spending at $9.5 billion,50 a 64 percent increase from $5.8 billion in 2022.51 DFC was responsible for $3.7 billion52 out of the U.S. government’s FY 2023 climate financing, illustrating this institution’s significant role in deploying U.S. climate financing abroad. The steady increase in international climate finance spending since 2021 suggests that the Biden administration is on track to meet the goal of $11.4 billion per year by 2024, yet congressional resistance has prevented President Biden from achieving international climate finance levels included in his budget request to Congress. Contributions to the Green Climate Fund, the world’s largest53 multilateral climate fund, have become highly politicized in the Republican-controlled U.S. House of Representatives; a prohibition on funding for the Green Climate Fund54 was included in the FY 2024 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs funding bill. Ultimately, this provision was struck from the final appropriations bill as part of a Senate-led effort to preserve the administration’s flexibility to transfer discretionary funds to the Green Climate Fund.55 However, a lack of broad bipartisan support for direct appropriations to the Green Climate Fund prevents financial assistance at the level that is needed, despite the $4 billion56 in unfulfilled pledges to the fund.57

The result of the 2024 U.S. presidential election could impact whether the United States fulfills its current international climate commitments. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, a conservative policy playbook, suggests that a future conservative administration would withdraw the United States from international institutions, including not only the 2015 Paris Agreement but the entire UNFCCC58 and the World Bank.59 Such a drastic move would go far beyond the absence of U.S. international climate finance on the world stage: Withdrawing from multilateral spaces would severely limit the ability of these institutions to provide climate financing—or any development aid—to Global South countries, putting remaining at or below the 1.5-degree Celsius warming limit out of reach.

COP29 presents the United States with an important opportunity to build on the Biden administration’s commitment to international climate finance by securing an ambitious new climate finance goal. To achieve this goal, U.S. government representatives should engage collaboratively in the process of establishing the NCQG, including the ad hoc work program and technical expert dialogues, as well as leverage diplomatic relationships to build support for a meaningful new climate finance goal that centers the needs of climate-vulnerable developing countries. Although determining the amount of financing is critical, U.S. negotiators must also prioritize the quality of the financing by increasing the share of below-market-rate financing,60 called concessional financing, and improving ease of access to resources.

Role of U.S. federal agencies in deploying climate finance

The United States mobilizes public resources to support climate projects in developing nations through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, DFC, and EXIM, among other agencies. The delivery of these resources takes different forms, ranging from guarantees to loans to grants, and they are deployed through bilateral and multilateral channels.

USAID and Department of State

USAID and the Department of State administer much of the U.S. government’s international adaptation financing through the PREPARE initiative. PREPARE, or the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience, was created61 to support more than half a billion62 people in climate-vulnerable developing countries in building resilience to climate impacts by 2030. One of the plan’s three components is “mobilizing finance and private capital.”63 This is achieved through increasing contributions to bilateral and multilateral adaptation funds, supporting the development of climate risk strategies, building partnerships with the private sector, and improving capacity to access financing. By increasing the flow of public and private financing into climate-vulnerable developing nations, PREPARE helps these countries access more adaptation financing as well as increase private investment by creating a less risky, more favorable business environment. In 2022, $2.3 billion64 of all U.S. international climate financing was directed at adaptation projects, and this financing plays a critical role in achieving PREPARE’s goal to build stronger relationships with allied developing nations.65 One example of this is a $7.2 million66 public-private partnership in Indonesia aimed at increasing the resilience, sustainability, and competitiveness of Indonesia’s cocoa industry.67 Indonesia is an important U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific region, with the two nations cooperating on ​​issues ranging from democracy to trade to resilience and mitigation.68 This PREPARE-led program serves to further strengthen that relationship and to help advance Indonesia’s climate and economic priorities.

DFC

DFC loans, investments, and guarantees for projects with climate benefits made up nearly 40 percent69 of all public U.S. international climate financing in FY 2023. As a development finance institution, DFC works with private-sector partners to grow their operations in a way that creates local value through economic development and ensures high labor, human rights, and environmental standards.70 An example of a DFC-backed project is the expansion of solar technology producer First Solar’s71 operation in India to include a new solar panel manufacturing facility in Tamil Nadu. DFC provided a $500 million loan72 to support this project, announced in January 2024, which is India’s first73 vertically integrated solar panel manufacturing plant. This project helps decrease costs of clean energy technology around the world; locally, it created 2,000 jobs during the building phase and more than 1,000 high-skilled jobs at the manufacturing facility; 40 percent74 of the latter are held by women. It also helps diversify the global solar panel supply chain: First Solar’s plant uses cadmium telluride sourced from India75 in its solar panels, creating an alternative to cadmium telluride sourced from China.76 This diversification helps counter Chinese dominance in the global solar panel manufacturing industry.

EXIM

There is significant potential to expand EXIM investment in clean energy. During the bank’s 2019 reauthorization, Congress implemented a new requirement that EXIM dedicate no less than 5 percent77 of its annual financing to promote exports related to renewable energy, energy efficiency, and energy storage. Since this target was established, investment in renewable energy increased from $29.5 million78 in FY 2020 to $907.9 million79 in FY 2023. However, EXIM is far short of reaching the 5 percent goal, which equates to around $6.75 billion80 annually. The most recent renewable energy project, a $900 million81 loan to the Ministry of Energy and Water of the Republic of Angola to build two photovoltaic solar energy power plants, was approved in 2023. This project will help Angola generate an estimated 500 megawatts of renewable energy, bringing the country a step closer to meeting its goal of reducing carbon emissions by 14 percent82 by 2025. At the same time, this project also supports U.S. economic competitiveness through the exporting of American-made solar panel mounting systems and other equipment while creating 1,600 jobs.83 With more than $70 billion84 in clean domestic manufacturing investments from the Inflation Reduction Act helping reinvigorate and expand this sector in the United States, EXIM must increase its investments in clean energy to meet the 5 percent goal.

With the deployment of international climate finance spread across these agencies and more, it is important that the United States take a whole-of-government approach to fulfill U.S. international climate finance commitments and advance American interests abroad. As part of a cross-government plan, the Biden administration should develop a five-year strategy for bilateral climate finance investments to key developing countries as part of a larger plan to deliver on the U.S. share of the NCQG by the agreed-upon deadline. Criteria for prioritized countries should include their ability to contribute to meaningful global emissions reductions, geostrategic importance, and opportunities for clean energy supply chain manufacturing.

Ending fossil fuel financing

Increasing resources behind mitigation and adaptation projects is not enough to transition to a clean energy economy and stay within the 1.5-degree Celsius warming limit; the United States must also stop financing fossil fuel projects abroad. At COP26 in 2021, the United States was one of 39 signatories85 to the Glasgow Statement86 on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition, which called for an end to new direct public financing of unabated fossil fuels abroad by the end of 2022, except in limited circumstances aligned with the 1.5-degree Celsius limit. Despite signing on to this statement, the United States has continued to invest in overseas fossil fuel development through both DFC and EXIM.

Citing Eastern Europe’s energy security in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, DFC provided a $500 million87 guarantee to Goldman Sachs for a liquified natural gas (LNG) project in Poland in 2023. This project was not a one-off: DFC invested $535 million88 in the development of a helium and LNG plant in South Africa in 2023, $400 million89 in a natural gas project in Moldova in 2022, and $50 million90 in a power plant fueled by gas and diesel in Sierra Leone in 2022. EXIM similarly continues to fund fossil fuel projects abroad. In March 2024, EXIM’s board of directors approved a $500 million91 loan guarantee to Bapco Energies, Bahrain’s state-owned energy company, for oil and gas development. The decision to fund this project was so controversial that it led to the resignations of two members92 of the bank’s climate advisory council. News of this project’s approval came less than a year after the board approved93 $100 million for an oil refinery in Indonesia. Not only are these projects at odds with the Glasgow Statement, calling into question the United States’ willingness to honor international climate commitments, but they also actively work against the international and domestic climate investments the government makes by continuing to fuel the climate crisis.

DFC and EXIM authorizations expire in 202594 and 2026,95 respectively, and both must be reauthorized by Congress to continue their work. The reauthorization process presents Congress with the opportunity to update the agencies’ mandates to prioritize environmental benefits and investments in renewable energy, as was done during EXIM’s 2019 reauthorization. The U.S. House and Senate committees overseeing EXIM and DFC reauthorization should require that both agencies stop new financing of fossil fuel projects abroad in keeping with the Glasgow Statement. As part of EXIM’s reauthorization, Congress should also remove from the bank’s charter Section 2(k),96 which prevents the board from denying financing for a project based on sector or industry alone. This section of the charter has been used to justify continued financing of fossil fuel projects abroad.97 EXIM must also develop a plan to meet the goal of dedicating 5 percent to renewable energy-related exports, with greater accountability measures implemented by the Office of the Inspector General, which has oversight98 of EXIM programs and operations.

Taking a 5-year climate finance outlook to drive climate action

As stated earlier in the report, the U.S. government has short-, medium-, and long-term actions it can take over a five-year period to meet international climate finance commitments and increase available resources. They include:

  • Leveraging international climate leadership to advance an ambitious New Collective Quantified Goal at COP29. Department of State negotiators must contribute to the creation of an ambitious and achievable NCQG that centers the needs of Global South countries. Increasing concessional financing and ease of access to resources, in addition to determining an impactful quantum, should be priorities. In the lead-up to COP29 in Baku, U.S. government representatives should engage collaboratively in the ad hoc work program and technical expert dialogues and conduct diplomatic outreach to allies to build support for a meaningful new climate finance goal.
  • Developing a cross-government plan through an interagency process to ensure a timely delivery of new climate finance commitments, including strategic bilateral climate finance investments for the next five years, under the NCQG. Through an interagency process, including but not limited to the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, USAID, DFC, and EXIM, develop a five-year strategy for bilateral climate finance investments to key developing countries as part of a larger plan to deliver on the U.S. share of the NCQG. These countries should be prioritized based on their ability to contribute to meaningful global emissions reductions, geostrategic importance, and opportunities for clean energy supply chain manufacturing.
  • Capitalizing on the upcoming congressional reauthorizations of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank to stop new financing of fossil fuel projects abroad in keeping with the United States’ international commitments. As Congress considers extending the authorization of DFC and EXIM ahead of their expirations in 2025 and 2026, respectively, it should leverage this moment to require these agencies to stop new financing of fossil fuel projects abroad. Doing so would put the United States in alignment with the Glasgow Statement, as well as strengthen the power of the climate finance investments these agencies are making. Additionally, Congress should revoke Section 2(k)99 from the bank’s charter, thus preventing the board of directors from denying financing for a project based on sector or industry alone, and mandate that EXIM submit a plan to dedicate 5 percent100 of annual financing to exports related to renewable energy.

Conclusion

More resources are needed to catalyze climate action during this critical decade. The United States is in a position to lead in shaping the international climate finance landscape, but doing so requires a strategy that builds on the progress of each passing year. Taking a five-year outlook to do just that could deliver beyond the dollar value of the United States’ financial contribution; it could inspire higher levels of ambition from other developed countries, amplifying the impact of any one country. As the world looks to Baku, Belém, and beyond for bold, necessary climate action, the Biden administration must leverage this opportunity to communicate a clear plan to meet the United States’ international climate finance commitments and lead developed countries in establishing an ambitious climate finance target to support Global South countries’ climate action.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Frances Colón, Anne Christianson, and Kalina Gibson for their contributions to this report.

Endnotes

  1. UNFCCC, “Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement Fifth session First global stocktake” (Bonn, Germany: 2023), available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_L17_adv.pdf.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Global Warming of 1.5°C” (Cambridge, United Kingdom, and New York: 2018), available at https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2022/06/SR15_Full_Report_LR.pdf.
  4. Matthew Solomon, Chavi Meattle, and Baysa Naran, “How big is the Net Zero financing gap?” (San Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative and New York: Allen & Overy, 2023), available at https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/how-big-is-the-net-zero-finance-gap/.
  5. Attracta Mooney, “COP29 host Azerbaijan defends role of oil and gas in climate change talks,” Financial Times, April 26, 2024, available at https://www.ft.com/content/225247f7-8949-436b-b17a-23d26f62688b.
  6. UNFCCC, “From Billions to Trillions: Setting a New Goal on Climate Finance,” April 29, 2024, available at https://unfccc.int/news/from-billions-to-trillions-setting-a-new-goal-on-climate-finance.
  7. UN Climate Change, @UNFCCC, February 28, 2024, 4:22 a.m. ET, X, available at https://x.com/UNFCCC/status/1762770256018207227.
  8. Solomon, Meattle, and Naran, “How big is the Net Zero financing gap?”
  9. Ken Silverstein, “Long-Duration Energy Storage Is Core To Tripling Renewables By 2030,” Forbes, March 25, 2024, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2024/03/25/long-duration-energy-storage-is-core-to-tripling-renewables-by-2030/?sh=3f7c7c924fac.
  10. Ibid.
  11. COP28, International Renewable Energy Agency, and Global Renewables Alliance, “Tripling renewable power and doubling energy efficiency by 2030: Crucial steps towards 1.5°C” (Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: International Renewable Energy Agency, 2023), available at https://www.irena.org/Digital-Report/Tripling-renewable-power-and-doubling-energy-efficiency-by-2030#page-1.
  12. International Energy Agency, “Energy Efficiency, 2023” (Paris: 2023), available at https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-efficiency-2023/executive-summary.
  13. Barbara Buchner and others, “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021” (San Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative, 2021), available at https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Full-report-Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2021.pdf.
  14. U.N. Environment Programme, “As climate impacts accelerate, finance gap for adaptation efforts at least 50% bigger than thought,” Press release, November 2, 2023, available at https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/climate-impacts-accelerate-finance-gap-adaptation-efforts-least-50.
  15. UNFCCC, “Fund for responding to loss and damage.”, available at https://unfccc.int/loss-and-damage-fund-joint-interim-secretariat (last accessed May 2024).
  16. Nina Lakhani, “$700m pledged to loss and damage fund at Cop28 covers less than 0.2% needed,” The Guardian, December 6, 2023, available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/06/700m-pledged-to-loss-and-damage-fund-cop28-covers-less-than-02-percent-needed.
  17. Julie-Anne Richards and others, “Standing in Solidarity with Those on the Frontlines of the Climate Crisis: A Loss and Damage Package for COP28” (Cambridge, MA: Unitarian Universalist Service Committee and London: Loss and Damage Collaboration, 2023), available at https://assets-global.website-files.com/605869242b205050a0579e87/655b50e163c953059360564d_L%26DC_L%26D_Package_for_COP28_20112023_1227.pdf.
  18. Barbara Buchner and others, “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2023” (San Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative, 2023), available at https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2023/.
  19. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Blended Finance,” available at https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/blended-finance-principles/#:~:text=Blended%20finance%20is%20the%20strategic,sustainable%20development%20in%20developing%20countries (last accessed May 2024).
  20. UNFCCC, “Draft decision -/CP.15 Copenhagen Accord” (Bonn, Germany: 2009), available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
  21. OECD iLibrary, “Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2021: Aggregate Trends and Opportunities for Scaling Up Adaptation and Mobilised Private Finance” (Paris: 2023), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/e20d2bc7-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/e20d2bc7-en.
  22. International Energy Agency, “Clean energy investment in emerging market and developing economies in the Net Zero Scenario Emissions by 2050, 2022 and 2030” (Paris: 2023), available at https://origin.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/clean-energy-investment-in-emerging-market-and-developing-economies-in-the-net-zero-scenario-emissions-by-2050-2022-and-2030.
  23. Kate Abnett, “Rich countries may have met $100 bln climate goal last year -OECD,” Reuters, November 16, 2023, available at https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/rich-countries-may-have-met-100-bln-climate-goal-last-year-oecd-2023-11-16/.
  24. OECD, Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2022 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/19150727-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/19150727-en.
  25. UNFCCC, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015 Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session” (Paris: 2015), available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=8.
  26. UNFCCC, “New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.”, available at https://unfccc.int/NCQG#Stock-takes-and-guidance-by-the-CMA- (last accessed May 2024).
  27. Cassidy Childs, “What the U.S. Must Bring to the 2023 U.N. Loss and Damage Negotiations To Address Climate Change Impacts,” Center for American Progress, March 20, 2023, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-the-u-s-must-bring-to-the-2023-u-n-loss-and-damage-negotiations-to-address-climate-change-impacts/.
  28. UNFCCC, “Fund for responding to loss and damage.”
  29. Ibid.
  30. Zack Colman, “‘A lot of anger’: U.S. faces flak as it pushes for World Bank to run climate fund,” Politico, October 19, 2023, available at https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/19/biden-climate-fund-fight-un-summit-00121772.
  31. Ibid.
  32. Ibid.
  33. The World Bank, “The World Bank and the United States,” available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/unitedstates#:~:text=The%20World%20Bank%20and%20the,support%20of%20Bank%20Group%20programs (last accessed May 2024).
  34. Lisa Friedman, “Climate Summit Approves a New Fund to Help Poor Countries,” The New York Times, November 30, 2023, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/climate/cop28-loss-and-damage.html.
  35. Julia Conley, “US Pledge to Loss and Damage Fund Called ‘Insulting… Paltry… Shameful’,” Common Dreams, December 1, 2023, available at https://www.commondreams.org/news/us-loss-and-damage.
  36. Barbara Buchner, “First ever study looking at multilateral development bank financing to cities in the Global South reveals a significant shortfall in financing for urban climate projects,” Climate Policy Initiative, Press release, December 2, 2023, available at https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/press-release/first-ever-study-looking-at-multilateral-development-bank-financing-to-cities-in-the-global-south-reveals-a-significant-shortfall-in-financing-for-urban-climate-projects/#:~:text=Over%20the%20seven%2Dyear%20period,invested%20in%20climate%2Drelated%20finance.
  37. Vandana Gombar, “World Bank’s $40 Billion Climate Funding Goal May Be Surpassed,” BloombergNEF, January 18, 2024, available at https://about.bnef.com/blog/world-banks-40-billion-climate-funding-goal-may-be-surpassed/#:~:text=The%20World%20Bank%20Group%20%E2%80%93%20the,fiscal%20year%20in%20June%202025.
  38. The World Bank, “Climate Finance Update,” October 10, 2023, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2023/10/10/climate-finance-update.
  39. Ibid.
  40. Sara Harcourt and others, “Net finance flows to developing countries turned negative in 2023,” ONE Campaign, April 16, 2024, available at https://data.one.org/data-dives/net-finance-flows-to-developing-countries/.
  41. Kate Donald and others, “To Tackle Climate Change, the Cycle of Crisis, Debt, and Underinvestment in the Global South Must End,” Center for American Progress, June 5, 2023, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/to-tackle-climate-change-the-cycle-of-crisis-debt-and-underinvestment-in-the-global-south-must-end/.
  42. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen at the Multilateral Development Bank Evolution Roundtable in Marrakech, Morocco,” Press release, October 13, 2023, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1805.
  43. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the World Bank Development Committee,” Press release, April 18, 2024, available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2283.
  44. The World Bank, “Climate Finance Update.”
  45. The World Bank, “World Bank Report Provides More Clarity on Callable Capital,” Press release, April 12, 2024, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/04/12/world-bank-report-provides-more-clarity-on-callable-capital.
  46. Ibid.
  47. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the World Bank Development Committee.”
  48. Valerie Volcovivi, “Biden pledges to double U.S. climate change aid; some activists unimpressed,” Reuters, September 21, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/us-seeks-double-climate-change-aid-developing-nations-biden-2021-09-21/.
  49. U.S. Department of State, “Progress Report on President Biden’s Climate Finance Pledge,” December 2, 2023, available at https://www.state.gov/progress-report-on-president-bidens-climate-finance-pledge/.
  50. Ibid.
  51. Ibid.
  52. Ibid.
  53. Green Climate Fund, “Home,” available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/ (last accessed May 2024).
  54. Democrats Appropriations Committee, “Republicans 2024 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Bill Threatens National Security,” Press release, June 22, 2023, available at https://democrats-appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/republicans-2024-state-foreign-operations-and-related-programs-bill-threatens#:~:text=Prohibiting%20funding%20for%20any%20loss,being%20attributed%20to%20climate%20objectives.
  55. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2882, 118th Cong., 2nd sess. (March 21, 2024), available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20240318/WDI39597.PDF.
  56. Green Climate Fund, “Resource mobilisation: Initial resource mobilisation,” available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/irm (last accessed May 2024); Green Climate Fund, “Resource mobilisation: GCF-2,” available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/gcf-2 (last accessed May 2024).
  57. $1 billion of that total dates back a decade to a pledge made under President Barack Obama, with the remaining $3 billion reflecting a pledge announced by Vice President Kamala Harris at COP28. See Green Climate Fund, “Resource mobilisation: Initial resource mobilisation”; Obama White House, “FACT SHEET: United States Support for Global Efforts to Combat Carbon Pollution and Build Resilience,” Press release, November 15, 2014, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/fact-sheet-united-states-support-global-efforts-combat-carbon-pollution-#:~:text=Today%2C%20President%20Obama%20is%20announcing,the%20poorest%20and%20most%20vulnerable; The White House, “FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Leverages Historic U.S. Climate Leadership at Home and Abroad to Urge Countries to Accelerate Global Climate Action at U.N. Climate Conference (COP28),” Press release, December 2, 2023, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/02/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-leverages-historic-u-s-climate-leadership-at-home-and-abroad-to-urge-countries-to-accelerate-global-climate-action-at-u-n-climate-conference-cop28/.
  58. The Heritage Foundation, “Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise: Project 2025” (Washington: 2023), available at https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf.
  59. Ibid.
  60. The World Bank, “What You Need to Know About Concessional Finance for Climate Action,” September 16, 2021, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/09/16/what-you-need-to-know-about-concessional-finance-for-climate-action.
  61. The White House, “President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE)” (Washington: The White House, 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Full-PREPARE-Plan.pdf.
  62. Ibid.
  63. Ibid.
  64. U.S. Department of State, “Progress Report on President Biden’s Climate Finance Pledge.”
  65. Ibid.
  66. U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Announces $7.2 Million Joint Initiative for a Sustainable, Climate-Resilient Cocoa Industry in Indonesia,” Press release, April 21, 2022, available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/apr-21-2022-usaid-announces-72-million-joint-initiative-sustainable-climate-resilient-cocoa-industry-indonesia.
  67. Ibid.
  68. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Indonesia,” April 19, 2022, available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/.
  69. U.S. Department of State, “Progress Report on President Biden’s Climate Finance Pledge.”
  70. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Who We Are,” available at https://www.dfc.gov/who-we-are (last accessed May 2024).
  71. First Solar, “Overview,” available at https://www.firstsolar.com/en/About-Us/Overview (last accessed May 2024).
  72. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “DFC CEO Marks U.S. $500 Million Loan for Strategic Supply Chain Diversification With Launch of New Energy Manufacturing Facility in India,” Press release, January 11, 2024, available at https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-ceo-marks-us-500-million-loan-strategic-supply-chain-diversification.
  73. Business Wire, “First Solar Inaugurates 3.3 GW Manufacturing Facility in India,” January 11, 2024, available at https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240111067742/en/First-Solar-Inaugurates-3.3-GW-Manufacturing-Facility-in-India.
  74. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “DFC CEO Marks U.S. $500 Million Loan for Strategic Supply Chain Diversification With Launch of New Energy Manufacturing Facility in India.”
  75. Katherine Walla, “How the US is pitching a development finance ‘alternative’ to China’s initiatives, according to Scott Nathan,” Atlantic Council, April 25, 2024, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-is-pitching-a-development-finance-alternative-to-chinas-initiatives-according-to-scott-nathan/.
  76. Ibid.
  77. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “The Charter of the Export-Import Bank of the United States” (Washington: 2019), available at https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/exim-bank-2019-charter-as-amended.pdf.
  78. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “All America: EXIM Supports American Jobs by Facilitating U.S. Exports” (Washington: 2020), available at https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/annual/2020/EXIM%202020%20Annual%20Report_508-Compliant%20PDF_Web_02102021.pdf.
  79. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Creating Locally, Exporting Globally: Helping American Businesses Win the Future” (Washington: 2023), available at https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/reports/annual/2023/EXIM_AnnualReport’23_27032023_Final.pdf.
  80. Sherri Ombuya and Igor Shishlov, “Alignment of the United States Export-Import Bank (US EXIM) with the US Climate and Development Policy Objectives” (Boston: Oxfam America, 2023), available at https://webassets.oxfamamerica.org/media/documents/US_EXIM_report.pdf.
  81. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Export-Import Bank of the United States Approves More Than $900M for Solar Energy Project in Angola,” Press release, June 1, 2023, available at https://www.exim.gov/news/export-import-bank-united-states-approves-more-900m-for-solar-energy-project-angola.
  82. Governo de Angola Ministerio Da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente, “Nationally Determined Contribution of Angola” (Luanda, Angola: 2021), available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/NDC%20Angola.pdf.
  83. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Export-Import Bank of the United States Approves More Than $900M for Solar Energy Project in Angola.”
  84. Frances Colón, Anne Christianson, and Cassidy Childs, “How the Inflation Reduction Act Will Drive Global Climate Action,” Center for American Progress, August 17, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-the-inflation-reduction-act-will-drive-global-climate-action/.
  85. UN Climate Change Conference UK, “Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition,” Press release, April 11, 2021, available at https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230313124743/https://ukcop26.org/statement-on-international-public-support-for-the-clean-energy-transition/.
  86. Ibid.
  87. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Public Information Summary, Host Country: Poland,” available at https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/9000116025_2.pdf (last accessed May 2024).
  88. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Public Information Summary, Host Country: South Africa,” available at https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/9000103744.pdf (last accessed May 2024).
  89. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Public Information Summary, Host Country: Moldova,” available at https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/9000115819.pdf (last accessed May 2024).
  90. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Public Information Summary, Host Country: Republic of Sierra Leone,” available at https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/9000104835.pdf (last accessed May 2024).
  91. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Export-Import Bank of the U.S. Approves Energy Sector Transaction,” Press release, March 14, 2024, available at https://www.exim.gov/news/export-import-bank-approves-energy-sector-transaction.
  92. Lisa Friedman and Hiroko Tabuchi, “Two Climate Advisers Quit U.S. Export-Import Bank Over Fossil Fuel Plans,” The New York Times, February 5, 2024, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/05/climate/export-import-bank-climate.html.
  93. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Export-Import Bank of the United States Board Approves Two Deals in Support of Thousands of U.S. Jobs in Transportation, Energy Sectors,” Press release, May 11, 2023, available at https://www.exim.gov/news/export-import-bank-united-states-board-approves-two-deals-support-thousands-jobs-transportation.
  94. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2025” (Washington: 2024), available at https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/documents/FY25%20Congressional%20Budget%20Justification.pdf.
  95. Congressional Research Service, “Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank)” (Washington: 2024), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10017.
  96. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “EXIM Bank Policies,” available at https://www.exim.gov/policies#:~:text=In%20accordance%20with%20Section%202,discriminate%20against%20an%20application%20based (last accessed May 2024).
  97. U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Strengthening American Competitiveness: Examining the Roles of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of the United States, and Millennium Challenge Corporation,” Subcommittee Hearing, May 15, 2024, available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/strengthening-american-competitiveness-examining-the-roles-of-the-us-international-development-finance-corporation-export-import-bank-of-the-united-states-and-millennium-challenge-corporation.
  98. Oxfam America, “Alignment of the United States Export-Import Bank (US EXIM) with the US Climate and Development Policy Objectives” (New York: 2023), available at https://webassets.oxfamamerica.org/media/documents/US_EXIM_report.pdf.
  99. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “EXIM Bank Policies.”
  100. Export-Import Bank of the United States, “The Charter of the Export-Import Bank of the United States” (Washington: 2019), available at https://img.exim.gov/s3fs-public/exim-bank-2019-charter-as-amended.pdf.

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